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Abstract 
 
This study analyses the decision making process which lies behind the drafting of the current 
legal framework regulating higher education system-level and institutional-level governance 
in Serbia. The research places particular focus on the relationship between the main actors in 
the process, namely the state, the academic community and the students, and looks into the 
logic of their actions, while also exploring the external factors which affected the decision 
making. The fundamental assumption underpinning this endeavour is that the analysis of the 
decision making process in question would offer an understanding of the rationale behind the 
governance changes, as well as provide an insight into factors affecting the decision making 
and consequently the output of the process as regards governance. The Institution Analysis 
and Development Framework has been employed as the prime analytical tool, while the 
research technique comprises of in-depth interviews with representatives of the main players 
and documentary analysis. 
The analysis draws several key conclusions. First, the process of deciding the latest 
governance transformations in Serbian higher education was to a greater extent affected by 
the dynamics of actors‟ interaction and preferences, than by supra-national trends which they 
resemble when given a surface look. Second, the decision making triggered the power 
redistribution in the higher education system in a way that it mirrored the power distribution 
pattern inside decision arenas. Third, institutional autonomy and resource dependence were 
not only in the heart of the debate, but also the key driving forces of the decision making on 
governance arrangements in Serbian higher education. 
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1 Investigating decision making on 
the higher education governance in 
Serbia 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Governance of higher education (HE) across Europe, particularly in its Western parts, is noted 
to be undergoing changes in recent years (de Boer, Enders, and Schimank, 2007). These 
changes are believed to be tightly linked with the changing relationship between higher 
education and the state, in which the state is seen as moving away from its controlling role to 
a more supervisory or facilitatory role (Maassen and van Vught, 1994), based on the belief 
that “supervising role of the state would lead to a better performance of higher education than 
a controlling role” (Maassen, 2009:99). This so-called “shift from government to governance” 
is linked to the notion that the traditional form of system coordination in which the 
government is the sole responsible for steering has been replaced by a form in which various 
actors at various levels take part in governance. In a similar fashion, higher education 
institutions (HEIs) are given more autonomy to run their own affairs under an implicit 
assumption that more autonomy would enable them to be more responsive to society, as well 
as to the state itself. Although the nature and the extent of either substantive or procedural 
autonomy HEIs enjoy may vary across countries, it is argued that the autonomy of HEIs has 
increased in recent years, which has been further facilitated by less prescriptive legal 
frameworks defining HE in a country (CHEPS, 2006). 
A surface look on the latest legal framework for HE in Serbia, 2005 Law on Higher Education 
(LoHE), if put against previous legal frameworks, shows movements in similar directions as 
regards both system-level and institutional-level governance arrangements. Without going 
into the discussion at this point on whether Serbian decision makers on governance 
arrangements had or did not have the intention to adopt any idea coming from a western 
European country, a deeper look at the current legal provision reveals not only certain 
inconsistencies with the underlying idea of the abovementioned governance changes found 
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with some other European countries, but also some peculiarities with respect to the 
redistribution of authority in the system and the dynamics in the relationships among key 
actors. This study discusses and further explores this phenomenon. Lastly, as the same legal 
framework which was passed in 2005 is in force today, this analysis refers also to the present-
day circumstances as regards governance arrangements. 
March (1994:vii) suggests that understanding any decision requires a great deal of “contextual 
knowledge – details about historical, social, political and economic worlds surrounding the 
decision and about the individuals, organizations, and institutions involved”. It is due to this 
reason in particular that these contextual factors are given attention in this study. 
1.2 The state and higher education in Serbia: a 
historical overview 
 
In order to set the stage for the study of the decision making herewith analysed, the system of 
HE in Serbia is first introduced by giving an outline of the developments since World War II, 
with a particular focus on the relationship between the state and higher education, as this is 
assumed to be of key relevance to the study of governance. 
After World War II, Yugoslavia became a socialist federal republic, basing its political and 
economic development on the Soviet model of the time, even though the political ties between 
the two countries soon became loosened. The main purpose of higher education at the time 
was seen as “to provide people with general background knowledge of their culture, essential 
professional skills, readiness for successful social life and world citizenship” (Mandić, 1992). 
The 1960s were marked by a massification of the tertiary sector, accompanied by founding 
two public universities in Serbia, the University of Novi Sad (1960) and the University of Niš 
(1965), alongside the already existing University of Belgrade. Following this trend and in 
response to the demand, the University of Priština and Kragujevac were founded in 1971 and 
1976, respectively
1
. This period was followed by a period of stagnation in enrolments which 
lasted until the 1990s. 
                                               
1 The universities founded in other Yugoslav republics are deliberately not mentioned, as they are beyond the 
scope of this study. 
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During 1950s, Yugoslavia started the process of decentralisation and liberalisation of its 
political and economic system, becoming soon the most decentralised of all socialist countries 
(Fisher and Gelb, 1991). Universities, being public entities themselves, were also subject to 
this policy, which lead to the introduction of the self-management system in all universities, 
by then divided into independent legal entities – faculties. From that point on, the faculties, 
not the universities as wholes were the main organisational units (Turajlić, 2004). Until the 
end of 1980s, the university remained a loose network of faculties, in which one had little 
concern with the affairs of the others (ibid). 
Still, these faculties were very much controlled by the state, which externally determined 
various aspects of institutions‟ internal affairs, be those related to governance, curriculum or 
enrolment (Turajlić, 2004). Yet, during this time, Turajlić noted, faculties showed little 
resistance to this, while the role of the university level was nothing more than administrative 
supervision, making the university a loose network of independent and distant faculties which 
were trying to balance between the externally imposed rules and internal preferences. In other 
words, the state control was more directed to faculty than to the university level. Clark 
(1983:45) found this state of affairs ironic, as “the minimal interdependence of units within a 
university comes not from age-old doctrines and practices of the medieval collegium carried 
into the modern period, but from one of the latest and most noted socialist experiments”. 
The 1980s brought growing political and economic instability of the federation, leading to the 
dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) in 1991. In the HE sector, 
the end of the decade brought a new wave of massification, as the funding of HEIs was now 
linked to student enrolments (Turajlić, 2004). The more populated faculties, inadequate 
enrolment policy and other encountered obstacles to the functioning of HEIs created growing 
dissatisfaction among the institutions. This dissatisfaction, together with the dissatisfaction 
with the politics of the state, appeared to have brought faculties closer to each other, in 
particular those which were noted for their disciplinary proximity, such as technical sciences, 
for instance (ibid). 
The years between 1991 and the turn of the 21st century for Serbia meant a decade of wars, 
sanctions, severe economic crisis, major social and political turmoil, all leading to general 
political, economic and social instability which marked the decade. All these were wrapped up 
in a veil of authoritarianism or arguably totalitarianism of the country‟s political leaders. 
During this period virtually each component of the system was affected by these conditions, 
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higher education included. Apart from having a severe impact on the functioning of the HE 
system, this period was also marked by some distortions in the relationship between the state 
and HEIs. Having assumed a more active role in the social life of the country, HEIs showed 
disagreement with the state politics in a more open way (through protests and 
demonstrations), which resulted in passing a new legal act on HE in 1992 which gave less 
autonomy and freedom the university than it had been initially envisaged (ME1, 2010). 
Although the University Law (LoU) from 1992 was considerably different and likely more 
progressive than its predecessor from 1990, it was considered far from guaranteeing autonomy 
to faculties. However, as the state did not achieve to make the university more passive, it 
enforced another legal framework in 1998, which was far more repressive one than its 
predecessor (Turajlić, 2004). 
After a decade of political, economic and social isolation, in 2000, the regime was overthrown 
and a new government was in place. Economic recovery and political stability became major 
aims of the newly elected democratic government, while the ambition to join the European 
Union became one of the main items on the government‟s political agenda. The Government 
was announcing major reforms in all fields, including higher education, which was to a great 
extent shared by some of the academic community and students (ME2, 2010; NS1, 2010; 
ST1, 2010). In 2003, the Minister of education signed the Bologna Declaration
2
, by which 
Serbia joined the rest of Europe in creating the common HE space. Nevertheless, as the 1998 
LoU was considered too repressive to be kept in force, a temporary solution was sought until 
a more permanent legal framework was developed. It was under this rationale that the 2002 
University Law was passed, which to a great extent resembled the 1992 law. Hence, the legal 
framework of 2002 is the starting point of our study, as this one was in force when the 
decision making process which is in the focus of this study took place. 
 
 
                                               
2 Bologna Declaration is an intergovernmental agreement signed in 1999 by 29 European ministers responsible 
for higher education. This act initiated the Bologna process, aiming at creating the European Higher Education 
Area. Currently, 47 countries are signatory to the Declaration and have committed themselves to converging 
their HE systems to the so-called Bologna action lines. More at: 
http://www.ond.vlaanderen.be/hogeronderwijs/Bologna/, retrieved on April, 23 2007. 
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1.3 Towards “modern” higher education 
 
Upon its appointment in 2001, the Ministry of Education and Sports (MoES) defined its 
mission as regards higher education as: “establishment of modern higher education system in 
accordance with the Bologna process” (MoES, 2003a:1). In order to facilitate this mission, the 
Ministry recognised the need to introduce changes in governance, at both system and 
institutional levels. 
In a nutshell, the decision making process had the following path. In 2002, in order to create 
legal conditions for HE reforms, the National Council for the Development of University 
Education (NCDUE) put in place a working group with the task to create a concept for the 
future legal framework for HE, which would also facilitate the reform agenda in line with the 
Bologna process. The representatives of the academic community and those of the students 
participated in the process, together with the state representatives. At the end of summer 2003, 
after the working group completed its work, the Ministry drafted the Law on HE. However, as 
certain academic circles, most notably at the University of Belgrade (BG1, 2010; BG2, 2010; 
BG3, 2010; MA1, 2010), were dissatisfied with the draft and disregarded it as violating 
university autonomy, the Ministry‟s text was now taken to be revised and amended by a new 
working group, this time appointed by the Council of the University of Belgrade. 
In the meantime, due to a political crisis triggered by the assassination of the prime minister, 
new elections took place, followed by the change in the political party in charge of higher 
education. This further resulted in changes in the Government‟s position towards HE and 
consequently the ministry‟s work on the new law on HE. As the previous ministry‟s draft was 
not passed, the work on it continued throughout 2003 and 2004, mostly within academic 
circles and without much interference from the Government. In the fall of 2004, the Ministry 
officially invited the University of Belgrade, other universities and student representatives to 
finalise the draft. 
In 2005, the Law on Higher Education was adopted by the Government and later passed by 
the National Assembly, which created the legal conditions for HE reforms and also changes in 
governance, soon to be followed by the first steps of the implementation process. In this 
respect, the period under study is 2002 – 2005. 
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1.4 Research problem 
 
This thesis goes inside the process of drafting the 2005 LoHE and looks into the decision 
making process of its creation which made way for the changes in external (system) and 
internal (institutional) governance arrangements, as well as into a wider context in which the 
decision making took place. The study places particular focus on the relationship between the 
chief actors in the process, namely the state, the academic community and the students, and 
looks into the logic of their actions in the decision process. The underlying assumption of this 
endeavour is that the analysis of the decision making process in question would offer an 
understanding of the rationale behind the governance changes, as well as provide with an 
insight on factors affecting the decision making and consequently the output of the process as 
regards governance. In a nutshell, the aim of the research is to analyse the decision making 
process with respect to the latest transformations of Serbian higher education governance, 
identify factors affecting the process and interpret its output (Figure 1.1). 
 
 
Figure 1.1 The research problem simplified 
 
Starting from the assumption that governance transformations can be better understood by 
analysing the decision making process in which they were created, the main research question 
is formulated as follows: 
How can the latest higher education governance arrangements in Serbia be explained? 
In order to address this question, the following sub-questions are put forward: 
 In what way can system-level decision making processes be described and analysed? 
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 How did the decision making process on the external and internal governance 
arrangements in Serbian higher educating unfold after 2002? 
 What have been the outcomes of the decision making process (the new governance 
arrangements) and how can they be interpreted? 
The main unit of analysis is the decision making process, which refers to the process of 
deciding on the external and internal governance arrangements in HE in Serbia, within the 
scope of drafting the 2005 Law on Higher Education, starting in 2002 and ending in 2005. 
This, however, does not include the decision making taking place at the level of institutions as 
regards governance, only the decision process related to drafting legal provision for HE at the 
state level. The thematic scope, however, covers governance at both system (sub-unit 1 of the 
analysis) and organisational level (sub-unit 2 of the analysis), where: 
 System-level governance (or external governance) refers to the institutional 
arrangements on the system or macro level, as defined in legislation; while 
 Institutional governance (or internal governance) refers to the institutional 
arrangements within a higher education institution (HEI), as defined in legislation. 
In this study, both governance levels are viewed through the lens of the interplay between the 
main actors herewith identified: the state, the academic community and the students. 
From the methodological point of view, this study addresses both macro and micro level 
phenomena, by the logic that both the decision making process (macro level) and those who 
participated in it (micro level) are the objects of the study.  
The analysis is based on the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework, a 
multi-tier conceptual map drawing from the rational choice approach to institutional analysis. 
The IAD framework is complemented by the understanding of the individual given in the 
bounded rationality approach, which rests on the assumption that individuals are only 
“intendedly” rational, as their rationality is constrained by cognitive and other boundaries. 
Semi-structured interviews and documentary analysis have been used as the data collection 
techniques, focusing on issues such as the decision making process, the participants in the 
process, their perceptions and mutual interaction, as well as the wider context in which the 
phenomena analysed took place. 
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1.5 Governance, higher education governance 
and current trends 
 
The term governance has a variety of meanings (Rhodes, 1996; Stoker, 1998). According to 
Peters (2001:1), governance generally refers to “a vast array of institutions designed to 
exercise collective control and influence over the societies and economies for which they have 
been given responsibility”. Governance can also be viewed as “a process through which 
collective interests are defined and pursued” and where “some degree of exchange between 
the state and society should be expected” (Peters and Pierre, 2004:78). The term governance is 
to be distinguished from the term government, as it does not necessarily need to be related to 
the state (Hewitt de Alcántara, 1998) and represents “a new process of governing; or a 
changed condition of ordered rule; or the new method by which society is governed” (Rhodes, 
1996:652).  
Due to growing importance of the international environment, changes in the relationship 
between government and the private sector, and limitations of the state in its capacity to 
govern, as Peters and Pierre (1998:223) argue, “the idea that national governments are the 
major actors in public policy and that they are able to influence the economy and society 
through their actions now appears to be in doubt”. Therefore, the national governance 
arrangements across Western democracies have underwent reform and consequently replaced 
by alternative models, which have been more or less permanent in their nature. However, 
although these reforms are largely identified in the Western part of the world, the elements of 
similar reforms can be found in the context of developing and transitional (i.a. post-
communist) countries, such as those of Central and Eastern Europe (Peters, 2001). 
These reforms, as Maassen (2003) argues, are driven both by ideological and pragmatic 
motives. While the pragmatic aspect is related to the growing limitations of the state to govern 
an increasingly complex society, the ideology story is arguably related to the rise of the new 
“managerialism” or New Public Management (NPM) philosophy, with which the emerging 
forms of governance share many features (Peters and Pierre, 1998). In a word, NPM refers to 
the influence of the private sector management mechanisms on the way public sector is 
organised and run, stressing the relevance of efficiency and effectiveness. This approach in 
reforming the public sector has been to a varying extent adopted not only by many 
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governments in coordinating HE in their countries, but also by HEIs across Europe (CHEPS, 
2006). 
With respect to HE governance, the trend refers to the general shift in governance 
arrangements from the traditional model in which the state is sole responsible for HE 
governing, system-level steering and planning, policy making and the coordination of the HE 
sector in a most general sense, to a new mode of governing that is different from the 
hierarchical control model and represents “a more cooperative mode where state and nonstate 
actors participate in mixed networks” (Enders, 2004:379). This shift is tightly linked to the 
notion that the state is transforming its traditional controlling role into a more supervisory 
role, while at the same time creating conditions for dynamic interaction of new structures and 
groups which operate at different levels of a HE system (“multi-level multi-actor 
governance”), from the local to the global (de Boer, Enders, and Schimank, 2007; Reed, Meek 
and Jones, 2002). However, this does not imply that the state as such is weakening, but rather 
transforming, and instead of surrendering to the challenges of a changing world, it is adapting 
to them (Enders, 2004; Maassen, 2003; van Vught, 1989). 
In the context of the HE in Europe, the CHEPS consortium study (2006) of governance 
reforms across Europe shows that the emergence of multi-level and multi-actor governance is 
a Europe-wide trend, even though the actual landscape is fairly heterogeneous. The study also 
confirms the abovementioned tendency of the state to move away from its controlling role 
towards a more supervisory role, while placing more emphasis on competition and increasing 
attention to the efficiency and effectiveness of HE. This deregulation for HEIs means more 
autonomy accompanied by more accountability, based on the belief that by being more 
autonomous, HEIs will be more responsive to the needs of the society. Moreover, the concept 
of institutional autonomy can be related to the concept of self-regulation. Maassen and 
Stensaker (2003) argue that self-regulation and increased institutional autonomy do not 
necessarily have to be understood as steering strategies, but as “an end in itself” whose 
symbolic attractiveness often surpasses its rational ground. Yet these two concepts do not 
entail the same phenomenon. This is in particular visible in the Serbian HE, in which self-
regulation, through the already existing self-management practice, has been present in the HE 
system since 1950s. However, in the same period HEIs enjoyed relatively low level of 
autonomy from the state authorities. 
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In the remainder of the chapter we turn to the latest transformations with respect to the HE 
governance arrangements in Serbia, introduced by the Law on HE in 2005, which were a 
result of the decision making process under study. Also several previous legal frameworks are 
observed, starting from the first Law on University passed after the dissolution of SFRY, due 
to the specific nature of affairs, described at the beginning of this chapter. Once the nature of 
transformations has been identified, we turn to the decision making process and look into the 
rationale of the transformations created within the decision making process. 
In order to identify the changes in governance arrangements envisaged by the 2005 Law on 
HE, the following questions will be addressed in the next section with respect to the changes 
introduced by the 2005 Law on Higher Education: 
 What is the nature of transformations with respect to the system-level/institutional 
governance structures?  
 Which stakeholders can be identified in these structures? 
 What is the composition and competences of these structures? 
Finally, it is important to reiterate that the legal acts of individual HEIs, such as statutes, are 
beyond the domain of this study, as the decision making process under study is about the 
changes in the state-level legal framework. Therefore, external and internal governance are 
analysed only as they are given in the law, i.e. the supreme legal act on HE in Serbia. 
In comparing the two legal frameworks, we consider a law prescriptive if a certain issue is 
regulated by it and not prescriptive if it is not. The extent of regulation of a particular matter is 
assumed to be linked with the level of autonomy of HEIs, meaning that if a legal framework 
does not prescribe how HEIs deal with a certain matter HEIs have autonomy in how the 
matter in question is dealt with, unless regulated by another legal act. 
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1.6 Transformations in higher education 
governance in Serbia 
1.6.1 System-level transformations 
 
From the dissolution of SFRY until 2005, the legal framework regulating HE in Serbia was 
changed three times, in 1992, 1998 and 2002. The Law on University from 2002 to a great 
extent resembled the University Law from 1992 (see Appendix 3), due to the fact that it was 
introduced as a temporary measure in order to put out of force the 1998 law. Apart from the 
ministry responsible for higher education, the 2002 law foresaw the establishment of the 
National Council for the Development of University Education (Republički savet za razvoj 
univerzitetskog obrazovanja). This body was responsible for issues such as criteria for 
founding new HEIs, financial conditions of universities, university development, participation 
of universities in the economic development of the country, the role of university in the 
scientific work of relevance for the country and other matters. The Ministry had jurisdiction 
over issuing work permits to HEIs, deciding on the content of diplomas and other documents, 
recognition of foreign qualifications, allocating financial resources to public universities, 
which was specified by a special regulation (Uredba o normativima i standardima), and 
carrying out administrative supervision. Apart from these, there was (and still exists) an 
organisation called the University Association of Serbia (Zajednica univerziteta Srbije), in 
which university representatives would meet and discuss the issues of their mutual interest. 
This structure was, however, not legally institutionalised, although it was recognised as the 
voice of public universities in the country. Likely, it is due to the fact that the law did not 
stipulate existence of such structure, that this association was considered representative of 
universities. 
With regards to the 2005 LoHE, the major structural novelty introduced concerns the 
reinstitutionalisation of the National Council for Development of University Education, as a 
joint state – academic community platform, on one hand, and institutionalisation of several 
new structures, on the other. The 2005 law foresees the following buffer bodies which are 
positioned in between the state and the HEIs: the National Council for Higher Education 
(NCHE) (Nacionalni savet za visoko obrazovanje), the Commission for Accreditation and 
Quality Assurance (CAQA) (Komisija za akreditaciju i osiguranje kvaliteta), the Conference 
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of Universities (Konferencija univerziteta), the Conference of Vocational HEIs (Konferencija 
akademija strukovnih studija) and two Student Conferences (Studentske konferencija), one for 
universities and the other for the students of vocational HEIs. The first two bodies are 
operating on the state level and are, together with the Ministry, steering structures, while the 
role of the conferences is to voice the interests of HEIs, on one hand, and HEIs student 
parliaments, on the other. Their composition is given in Appendix 3. 
Regarding the Ministry in charge of higher education, its competences now also incorporate 
HE policy development, which needs to be first proposed by NCHE. Interestingly, the 2002 
law did not mention policy development or any similar concept. On the other hand, NCHE 
has overtaken some of the competences previously belonging to the Ministry, such as 
monitoring of HE development, now making sure that these were in line with European and 
international standards. NCHE provides opinion on enrolment policy, adopts quality 
assurance and accreditation standards, decides on the scientific and artistic fields and has 
other responsibilities. CAQA is a body appointed by NCHE for the purpose of conducting the 
accreditation process and taking part in the development of quality standards. Both bodies, 
their composition and how they are formed are defined by the law. It is important to note that 
a joint state – academic community body, as the NCDUE had been, is not foreseen by this 
law. 
Regarding the conferences, their role is to voice the position of HEIs they represent, as 
regards teaching, research and artistic activities, enrolment policy, quality standards and 
measures focused on improvement of material conditions of universities and students. The 
Conference of Universities also proposes members of the NCHE and CAQA, after the pre-
selection procedure through a public call. 
In sum, when it comes to the system level, the 2005 law is rather detailed in defining the 
newly introduced structures and their competences, in particular NCHE and CAQA, while in 
the case of the Student Conferences the situation is somewhat different. Interestingly, all the 
elements of the law regulating the system-level competences which had not existed before 
2005 fall into the area of responsibility of the new system-level structures, rather than the 
Ministry. This in particular refers to the issues related to quality assurance and accreditation, 
as well as HE policy development in general. On the other hand, some of the competences 
previously resting with the Ministry or the 2002 LoU National Council are now either shared 
with the NCHE, CAQA and conferences or completely transferred to their jurisdiction. 
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An interesting notion with regards to the system-level structures, namely NCHE and CAQA, 
is that they both are populated by the members of the academic community in majority. It is 
due to this reason that the academics are now more involved in the system-level governance 
activities than they had been prior to this law. Moreover, it has been argued that these 
transformations of external governance arrangements entails a redistribution of authority in 
the system. In other words, the authority nominally shared between the state and the academic 
oligarchy has now shifted towards the hands of the academia, which has now emerged as a 
system-level steering force (Branković, Šabić, Vukasović, forthcoming). 
It is also argued that this multiplication of structures at the system level brought by the 2005 
law, as well as their composition (see Appendix 3, Table A1), could be interpreted either as a 
sign of increased trust the state has towards the academic community or of the lack of interest 
in higher education (Turajlić, 2009). Even though this is not entirely clear, this situation does 
indicate that the state is moving away from controlling towards supervising the system and 
resembles the “less government and more governance” mode. 
1.6.2 Institutional-level transformations 
 
As it was indicated in section 1.2.1, ever since 1950s faculties in Serbia have been 
independent legal entities, with a high level of institutional autonomy, both from the 
university level and from the state. This state of affairs was present in 2002 and it is still the 
case. An interesting novelty introduced by 2005 LoHE was the concept of higher education 
institution, which refers to “university, faculty or academy of arts within a university, 
academy of professional career studies, four-year college, four-year college of professional 
career studies” (LoHE, 2005). The first two belong to the university sector, while the latter 
three are considered non-university HE (or, as here also referred, vocational HE) and had not 
been regulated by the same act as universities in previous periods. All five are independent 
legal entities and are guaranteed institutional autonomy by the Constitution, which is further 
specified by the law. 
According to the 2002 law, there were two internal governance structures of a 
university/faculty: the governing body and the professional body. The governing body 
14 
 
consisted of the Board (Savet) and the Rector/Dean
3
, while the professional body referred to 
the (Academic) Council (Nastavno-naučno/nastavno-umetničko veće) (see Appendix 4, Table 
A2). The law also envisaged one or more Vice-Rectors/Vice-Deans and one student Vice-
Rector/Vice-Dean. Only full university professors (from the university in question) were 
eligible for the position of the Rector/Dean and Vice-Rectors/Vice-Deans. Rector/Dean and 
Vice-Rectors/Vice-Deans were appointed and dismissed by the Board, after being nominated 
by the Council and the Rector/Dean, respectively. 
On the other hand, the 2005 law specifies four types of institutional governance entities: the 
governing body, the professional body, the executive officer (organ poslovođenja) and the 
student parliament. Their composition/formation is given in Appendix 3, Tables A2-3. The 
2005 law is more prescriptive than the 2002 one when it comes to the composition of the 
Board and how it is formed, but it is far less prescriptive when it comes to the selection 
procedure and competences of the Rector/Dean and those of the Council. These are left to 
HEIs to be decided upon. 
According to the 2002 law, the Board of the university was composed of two representatives 
of each faculty, one of each institute, the representatives delegated by the university student 
parliament (on fourth of the total number of faculty and institute representatives) and the 
representatives of the founder
4
 (on fourth of the total number of faculty and institute 
representatives). To illustrate, if a university had 15 faculties and 6 institutes its Board would 
have 52 members. The competences of the University Board included: the adoption of statutes 
and financial report of the university (not the faculties), yearly planning and budgeting, 
founding of university centres and other. The Faculty Board had more or less the same 
competences, only adapted to the faculty level. The selection of the Rector and Dean is a 
competence of the University and Faculty Board, respectively (see Appendix 4, Table A3). As 
it had been the case by the law from 2002 and those before it, the 2005 law treats both Rector 
and Dean as primus inter pares, i.e. they are as a rule full professors at their respective 
faculty/university. 
On the other hand, the Council gathered faculty Deans, institute Directors, one full professor 
from each faculty and the Rector and Vice-Rectors. In the case of a 15-faculty and 6-institute 
                                               
3 Rector – refers to the university level executive; Dean – refers to the faculty level executive. 
4 In the case of public HEIs the founder refers to the government. 
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university, this would mean at least 38 members. The list of competencies of the Council is 
somewhat longer. The Council was responsible for the academic aspects of university life, 
such as approving study programmes of individual faculties, but without going into the 
specific academic matters of individual faculties, for which the Faculty Council was 
responsible. The Council also approved the university s and provided opinion on the number 
of students financed from the state budget. Finally, the 2002 law also foresaw student 
parliaments, though it was not prescriptive when it comes to their composition and 
competences in their respective institutions. 
As for the 2005 LoHE, it is important to emphasise that it refers to both university and faculty 
as higher education institutions per se, which means that when it defines a structure and 
provides competences of a body within a HEI, this simultaneously refers to the university and 
faculty, as well as other types of HEIs. The 2005 law stipulates that the Board adopts the 
statutes, financial plans and activity report, manages institution‟s property and decides on the 
tuition fees. All of these need to be first proposed by the Council. The Board selects and 
removes the executive officer (Rector/Dean), reports to the founder and performs other 
activities in line with the law. Apart from the abovementioned competences shared with the 
Board, the Council is also responsible for the academic matters. 
In general, when it comes to the governing bodies and their responsibilities at the level of 
institution, it could be said that they were to a great extent defined by the law in place, be this 
the law of 1992, 1998 or 2002. The 2005 law is less prescriptive, as it gives more freedom to 
HEIs in determining their own professional and executive bodies and thus entails more 
autonomy for HEIs in this domain. However, when it comes to the matters such as studies, 
quality assurance, or promotions, the 2005 law is to the same extent or more prescriptive than 
its predecessors. 
Last but not least, in order to secure a higher level of integration of HEIs, the law requires 
them to “assure unified and coordinated activities of the higher education institution”, while 
for universities to “integrate the functions of all the institutions and units that it comprises, 
particularly the faculties, by conducting unified policies aimed at continual promotion of the 
quality of courses and improvement of scientific research and artistic creativity” (LoHE, 
2005, Art. 48). 
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1.6.3 Summing up transformations 
 
On the whole, regarding the governance transformations from 2002 LoU to 2005 LoHE, the 
following conclusions can be drawn with respect to the external and internal governance: 
 2005 LoHE has introduced “buffer” bodies into the system, although these are not 
independent, as they are “almost fully colonised by the academics” (Lažetić, 2009:73) 
and no other party apart from the state and its appointees, the HEIs and students are 
represented in these bodies. 
 2005 LoHE has envisaged that some of the responsibilities previously belonging solely 
to the Ministry are now shared with the “buffer” structures or transferred to them. This 
so-called sideways shift in governance arrangements has been recognised as a trend in 
governance across Europe (Maassen, 2003). 
 Quality assurance is one of the major novelties the 2005 LoHE contains. NCHE and 
CAQA are buffer bodies whose primary domain of responsibility is precisely quality 
assurance and accreditation of HEIs and study programmes. Quality had been little, if 
at all, addressed within legal frameworks prior to 2005 and this goes well in line with 
current European trends (Maassen, 2003; Lažetić, 2009). In addition, the emphasis on 
the quality in HE is by some recognised as the main item in the re-regulation of HE, at 
the backdrop of the recognised trend of deregulation (Maassen, 2003). 
 2005 LoHE has empowered students by introducing student bodies at the national and 
institutional levels and by prescribing student involvement in matters presumed to be 
of their direct interest (mainly studies and quality). 
 2005 LoHE is less prescriptive when it comes to the internal organisation of individual 
HEIs, in particular regarding the legal status of faculties, which are still to a great 
extent independent from the university level. While the curriculum and quality 
assurance are to some extent transferred to the university level decision making, this 
has not been the case with most internal governance procedures and financing issues. 
 In order to secure more coordinated functioning of HEIs, in particular universities, the 
law introduces the so-called “integrative function” of the university, in which it asks 
for a more unified and coordinated activities. 
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 Even though the 2005 law stipulates higher level of institutional autonomy of HEIs, it 
does not foresee evaluation mechanisms targeting the output of institutions‟ activities. 
In this sense, the law does not make any kind of linkage between autonomy 
accountability, which had as well been the case with previous legal frameworks. 
 The 2005 law has secured a deeper involvement of the professional body, i.e. the 
Council, in non-academic matters, such as strategic and financial issues, investments 
and so on. In principle, by this law the Council is the one issuing proposals to be 
adopted by the Board. Apart from increasing the level of the professoriate in 
institutional decision making, this solution also creates incoherence as regards 
managerial and academic roles of the two bodies. 
Last but not least, the governance transformations were more extensive at the system level 
than at the level of institutions. The 2005 law brought new areas of activity into higher 
education in Serbia, such as quality, student workload, focus on learning outcomes, cycle-
system of studies, university as an integrated entity, international dimension of HE, some of 
which are part of the so-called “Bologna” narrative. These novelties further triggered some 
changes in how system and institutions are governed. 
1.7 Thesis overview 
 
The research consists of three complementary components: (a) conceptual considerations and 
operationalisation, (b) methodology and data collection, and (c) the description and analysis 
of findings, followed by conclusions. The thesis is organised in five chapters. The following 
chapter (2) introduces the analytical framework, starting from a discussion on the conceptual 
premises of decision making which is followed by the introduction of the Institutional 
Analysis and Development framework and the bounded rationality concept, followed by 
operationalisation necessary for this study. Chapter 3 elaborates on the methodological 
considerations, data collection, reliability and validity of research findings and limitations. In 
Chapter 4 the research findings are presented, analysed and discussed, followed by 
conclusions. Chapter 5 reflects on the conclusions, the analytical framework and methodology 
used. 
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2 Analytical framework 
 
This chapter is divided in three parts. First, the concept of decision making is introduced and 
discussed, followed by the overview of the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) 
framework and its constituent parts. The bounded rationality concept is introduced together 
with the IAD framework and linked to the corresponding IAD framework element, i.e. the 
participant. The final part of the chapter operationalises the research problem by using the 
logic and components of the framework.  
2.1 Conceptualising decision making 
 
Decision making is a relatively broad concept and it is approached from a wide range of social 
science disciplines – economics, political science, organization studies, public administration, 
anthropology, sociology, psychology etc. (March, 1994; Ostrom, 1999). Apart from supplying 
the decision making debate with abundance of exhaustive analyses and different perspectives 
and extensively contributing to its better understanding, the many different approaches bring 
along some premises from their original disciplines which, as it seems, do add to a better 
understanding of the complexity of decision making as an object of study, but it 
simultaneously creates conceptual inconsistencies in addressing the problem of decision 
making. 
March (1994) identifies four issues with respect to decision making which persistently divide 
scholars from various disciplines. The first is whether decisions are based on rational thinking 
and follow the logic of consequence or are they rule-based and follow the logic of 
appropriateness. The second issue rests on the dilemma whether decision makers are 
consistent in their choices or whether their actions are inconsistent and ambiguous. Third, 
decision making is either primarily directed to problem solving or to generating social 
meaning. The fourth matter of debate is, according to March, whether the outcomes of 
decision making are attributable solely to individuals or to the combined effect of interacting 
individuals, organisations and societies.  
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Instead of attempting to make the distinction between these four debates more elaborate, a 
rather ideational grouping of arguments is made (Table 2.1). In order to approach the problem 
in a more coherent and straightforward fashion, it is assumed that these two sets of attributes 
represent two extremes within which scholars move back and forth down the continuum in 
approaching and studying decision making, be it in the case of logic of action, consistency, 
orientation or the referential level of analysis, as March divides them. 
Decisions as rational Decisions as appropriate 
Logic of expected consequence Logic of appropriateness 
Consistency Inconsistency, ambiguity 
Problem oriented Social meaning oriented 
Individualistic Holistic, constructionist 
Table 2.1 Two logics of decision making (adapted from March, 1994) 
This alignment of features is further supported by a distinction March and Olsen made 
between two conventional approaches to decision making in the context of political behaviour 
(1996:248). The first one “sees politics as a market for trades in which individual and group 
interests are pursued by rational actors” which “emphasizes the negotiation of coalitions and 
„voluntary‟ exchange”, while the second one is the story of appropriateness, preferences vis-à-
vis identities and social institutions. The former belongs to the rational choice family of 
theories, likely to be more comfortably nested among disciplines such as economics or 
political science, while the latter belongs to the neo-institutionalist school of thought and is 
often seen as part of the sociological narrative (e.g. Powell and DiMaggio, 1991).  
In the following paragraphs some postulations of these two “logics of action” will be 
discussed, though not with the ambition to make peace between the sides but rather to 
introduce them as an ideational background against which the analytical framework chosen 
from this study is positioned. It would be important to note that a terminological inconsistency 
permeates this debate among scholars and it is therefore difficult to be consistent in this 
chapter either, as it is using phrases, messages and citations from the authors themselves. 
Ostrom observes that if every social science discipline (or subdiscipline) uses different key 
terms, defines these differently and also focuses on different level of analysis, it is no wonder 
that “the discourse resembles the Tower of Babel rather than a cumulative body of 
knowledge” (2005:11). To illustrate, e.g. in the eyes of some scholars institutionalism is in 
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contrast to interpretations of politics which assume that actors are rational and result oriented 
(e.g. March, Meyer, Olsen), while for some political scientists institutionalism incorporates a 
rational choice perspective (e.g. see Hall and Taylor, 1996). In addition, scholars of none of 
the disciplines have to be unconditionally loyal to either of the two approaches, which implies 
that, for example, if a scholar is a sociologist he or she does not necessarily argue against 
rationalism, even though this is often the case. This is in particular amplified if what is seen as 
one school of thought is internally rife with debate. Another important notion is that this is an 
ongoing debate which means that positions and argumentations are subject to constant change 
and have changed so far. Nonetheless, in order to make this introduction more coherent, the 
rationalism – institutionalism dichotomy shall be used, unless indicated differently. 
The point of divergence can be traced back to some basic assumptions regarding the 
individual and its place in a wider social context upon which some of the disciplines 
addressing decision making traditionally rest. As stated above, scholars from the rationalist 
tradition postulate that individuals are opportunistic and guided by interests, reward and 
constraints imposed by social environment (Coleman, 1990). Similarly, transaction cost 
economics is based on the assumption that individuals attempt to maximise their behaviour to 
their own benefit with a tendency to be consistent in doing so (Coase, 1937, 1960; 
Williamson, 1985). This rationalistic approach is in March and Olsen‟s language placed under 
the logic of expected consequences approach, which is in turn put against the logic of 
appropriateness, promoted primarily by institutionalists, the two authors included. 
Sociologists go even further in this debate by denying that even on the micro level individuals 
cannot be purely rational as rationality as such is bounded or limited which, according to these 
scholars, makes this approach self-limiting (Simon, 1976; March, 1989).  
Regarding the unit of analysis, most institutionalists tend to focus on the social environment 
and the effects of macro level structures on the microlevel processes, while the operations on 
the microlevel are of less relevance in the sense that individuals are not fully “in charge” of 
their own decisions, as these are constrained by rules, expectations or simply cognitive 
limitations. This holistic or constructionist position is in line with the assumption that 
collective choices cannot be deduced to individual preferences as individuals are often guided 
by institutions, appropriateness or other societal factors which are in essence beyond the 
individual and more often than not beyond their influence (March, 1994). Interests are 
institutionally constructed, while social problems are discovered only when they “fit within 
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existing social institutions” (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991:28). On the other hand, for instance, 
transaction cost economists see transactions as the basic unit of analysis (Williamson, 1981), 
while more radical rationalists reject holism to the benefit of methodological individualism. In 
their view, the point of departure is the individual, or the micro level unit, while the collective 
action is seen as a sum of individual interests or preferences which can be in return 
decomposed to individual choices. Such view of rationality is characterised as atomistic 
(Jaeger et al., 2001). In referring to this matter, Powell and DiMaggio (1991:2) argue that 
collective political and economic behaviour cannot be interpreted as an aggregate of 
individual choice while not taking into account the context, as it was claimed by, e.g. 
behavioralists. 
Without striving to engage in an elaborate debate on institutionalism, it seems vital to mention 
that, at least taken from a sociological point of view, the story of decisions and choices is 
intimately related to the story of social institutions and related body of theoretical work. As 
indicated above, institutionalism is an approach found within several disciplines: economics, 
organization theory, political science and public choice, history, and sociology – “united by 
little but a common scepticism towards atomistic accounts of social processes and a common 
conviction that institutional arrangements and social processes matter” (Powell and 
DiMaggio, 1991:3). In this sense institutionalism does bring all these disciplines together but 
their own disciplinary premises keep them apart and in constant debate over a wide range of 
related issues, even very fundamental ones. For instance, some of them do not even label the 
same phenomena “institution”. In economics and public choice theory institutions are 
“products of human design, the outcomes of purposive actions by instrumentally oriented 
individuals”, for Shepsle and some other political scientists institutions are often perceived as 
“scripts that constrain behavior” and not subject to human agency (2006:26), while for 
sociologists institutions comprise a far broader set of concepts, from handshakes to vacation 
to state agencies (Jepperson, 1991:144; Hall and Taylor, 1996). Arguably institutionalists 
largely disagree on the relationship between individual agency and institutions, on how 
institutions come to be, how they change and resist change and how they die, as well as why 
and under what circumstances these occur and what is the role of differently oriented 
individuals in the process, be they rational, consistent, more informed or less informed. In this 
respect, in the work on institutions there is no such thing as a unified body of thought. 
However, some scholars have suggested different typologies or approaches to analysing 
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institutions. For instance, in the case of political science, Hall and Taylor (1996) talk about 
three new institutionalisms: sociological, rational choice and historical. 
Ultimately, institutions are tightly linked to decision making, either by constraining it, as 
rationalists would argue, or by guiding it, as more constructionist institutionalists would 
advocate. Yet decisions are motivated by some factors, be they exogenous or endogenous 
with respect to the decision maker. A great deal of the discussion briefly presented above 
boils down to this notion, in the sense that while some scholars argue in the favour of one 
group of factors to be the dominant ones in defining decision making, others argue for 
another. In other words, it is a battle of perspectives both of which rest on somewhat different 
paradigmatic assumptions about, in this case, what motivates choice, and are therefore 
difficult to contrast in a single empirical endeavour. 
As there are many approaches anchored at different points down the continuum between the 
extremes, it is likely that neither the rationalist nor institutionalist approach have a potential to 
fully grasp the complex nature of choice or decision making. As it appears, no school of 
thought seems to be fully comfortable with the explanation of decision making it has 
developed and is therefore constantly striving to accommodate conflicting arguments in the 
existing approach (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). Shepsle (2006:14) observed this in the 
context of rational choice institutionalism: 
In defense of the early program in rational choice institutionalism, it must be 
acknowledged that a paradigm, as Kuhn (1970) reminded us, develops protective 
boundaries in order to permit normal science to progress […] Eventually, however, 
some of the criticism is constructive, it begins to attract attention, the boundaries 
weaken, and practitioners seek ways to accommodate what they had formerly rejected. 
I believe this is the current state of the program in rational choice institutionalism. It 
is increasingly responsive, not imperialistic, and the distinctions between it and its 
institutionalist cousins are beginning to weaken. 
As it is summarized in this excerpt, in the heat of debate many conflicting arguments arise, 
which does provoke responsiveness, reconsideration of premises and finally compromises. 
Hence, finding the middle ground is something many scholars have sought and, in that 
process, produced insightful approaches. For instance, the institutional theory has been 
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challenged for its neglecting of active agency in organisational responses. Yet some 
proponents of new institutionalism, such as Oliver, argue that “institutional theory can 
accommodate interest-seeking, active organizational behavior when organizations' responses 
to institutional pressures and expectations are not assumed to be invariably passive and 
conforming across all institutional conditions” (1991:146). In supporting Oliver‟s typology of 
these institutional responses, Scott (1996:125) argues that organisations can indeed act 
collectively in creating an institutional framework and thus amplify their power with respect 
to the environment of which they are a part, a view to some extent shared by e.g. Olson‟s 
logic of collective action (1965). 
Up to this point the discussion has been only a glimpse into a decades long and exhaustive 
debate on, put it simply, what guides action. The focus, however, has been on some basic 
aspects, without going into elaborate discussions, as it would be beyond the purpose and 
scope of this thesis. 
In analysing a political or social phenomenon such as decision making is, choosing an 
approach which brings together some premises from both sides seems a rather logical way of 
approaching the decision making researched in this project. Furthermore, assuming one of the 
perspectives does not necessarily have to mean rejection of all the premises coming from 
another one. On the contrary, a complex research problem, such as decision making, needs to 
be analysed with a tool which is flexible enough and can accommodate different approaches. 
Schlager (1999) and Ostrom (2005) make the distinction between three conceptual levels: 
frameworks, theories and models. In brief, a framework lies at the broadest conceptual level 
and it is a tool which enables the analyst to identify and organise the elements of inquiry and 
their mutual relationships. It is flexible and it allows for different theories to be used and 
combined, but in itself it cannot predict behaviour or outcomes (Schlager, 1999). A theory is 
more specific and it is used for making assumptions about elements necessary for diagnosing 
and explaining phenomena and predicting outcomes. Unlike frameworks, theories can explain 
and predict, which is also true of models. Finally, a model makes assumptions about a limited 
set of parameters and variables and is the most specific and rigid of the three (Ostrom, 
2005:28). This thesis, however, uses only a framework, as it aims at identifying elements of 
the decision making and their mutual relationships and does not strive to predict future events. 
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In sum, decision making is a very complex phenomenon to analyse. In order grasp it as it is 
envisaged in the research problem, the Institutional Analysis and Development framework, 
developed by Elinor Ostrom and her colleagues, is suggested as the analytical tool. The next 
part analyses this framework and discusses what Ostrom‟s institutionalism suggests for 
understanding decision making. 
2.2 Institutional Analysis and Development 
Framework as a tool for analysing decision 
making 
 
Within the rational choice tradition, Elinor Ostrom is noted for her work on institutions. The 
Institutional Analysis and Development Framework (IAD framework) is a “multitier 
conceptual map” which treats choice making as an operation on both micro and macro levels 
(Ostrom, Gardner and Walker, 1994; Ostrom, 2005). It was first developed in 1970s by 
Ostrom and her colleagues and although developed from the research on common pool 
resources and being more related with the rational family of theories, such as game theory, 
public choice and others, IAD framework also incorporates some of the premises of the 
institutional theory, in particular those related to the rules and related social constructs. In 
effect, Ostrom‟s idea while developing the framework was to integrate work undertaken by 
political scientists, economists, anthropologists, psychologists, sociologists, lawyers and other 
who were contributing to the understanding of how institutions affect individual behaviour. 
IAD framework is, as Ostrom phrased it, an attempt to “develop a conceptual approach that 
hopefully has a higher chance of cumulation than many of the separate paths currently in 
vogue in contemporary social sciences” (2005:11). Yet, different analysts tend to focus on 
different elements of the IAD framework, depending on the nature of the disciplinary 
approach assumed (Ostrom, 1999:49). 
For Ostrom institutions are “the prescriptions humans use to organise all forms of repetitive 
and structured interactions including those within families, neighborhoods, markets, firms, 
sports leagues, churches, private associations, and governments at all scales” (2005:3). 
Ostrom further adds: “Individuals interacting within rule-structured situations face choices 
regarding the actions and strategies they take, leading to consequences for themselves and for 
others.” Ostrom argues that social behaviour is constructed from universal components 
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organised in several layers which affect the behaviour and results individuals achieve. The 
IAD framework, being a multilayered one is Ostrom‟s response to this challenge (2005:8). 
As mentioned above, within the IAD discourse, human decision making is the outcome of 
many layers of internal processing, from macrolevel phenomena to cognitive structures, with 
cognitive structures such as individuals‟ intrinsic values or beliefs at the bottom layer and 
groups of individuals – families, organisations, nations etc. – on the top of it. These are in turn 
parts of larger structures, or in other words “what is the whole system at one level is a part of 
a system at another level” (Ostrom, 2005:11). 
2.2.1 Decomposing Ostrom’s IAD framework 
 
The core unit of analysis of the IAD framework is an action arena in which participants and 
action situations interact (Figure 2.1). It is therefore “the social space where individuals 
interact, exchange goods and services, solve problems, dominate one another, or fight” 
(Ostrom, 1999:42). In the process of generating interactions that produce outcomes which 
feed back onto the participants and the action situation, the action arena is affected by a set of 
exogenous variables. Apart from these, evaluative criteria are used to evaluate performance 
of the action arena and its outputs. Even though exogenous variables (here also referred to as 
context variables) are treated as fixed when studied, they may be affected by the outcomes. 
 
Figure 2.1 The IAD framework (Ostrom, 2005) 
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An action arena can be decomposed into two main components: participants and action 
situations (Figure 2.1). The remainder of this part of the chapter is dedicated to these two 
components, followed by the description of the exogenous variables and the multi-tier aspect 
of the IAD framework. 
Participants and rationality 
 
Participants hold the central position in the action situation. Ostrom distinguishes among three 
types of attributes participants (actors) have in an action situation: status, number and 
individual attributes. Participants in an action arena can have individual or team status, 
depending on the arena itself. Under particular circumstances a group of individuals can be 
considered as one participant (Ostrom, 2005:38) and in this case certain prerequisites need to 
be satisfied, such as that the group of individuals given the status of one participant or a team 
needs to be composed of individuals which share many similar characteristics so that the 
aggregate behaviour observed of a group is predictable by drawing from the characteristics of 
a sample of individuals (Scharpf, 1997 in Ostrom, 2005:39). The individual attributes refer to 
participants‟ personal attributes such as age, gender, education, ethnic background etc., as 
well as their cognitive structures. Attributes of participants can be ascribed or acquired and 
they are also seen as “affected by rules structuring the action situation” (Ostrom, 2005:40). 
Apart from attributes, individuals can also share same preferences in a particular action 
situation and thus be considered to act as a group. However, even though they may act as a 
group or a collective actor in one action arena, they internally could have their own decision 
making mechanisms and ways of deciding on the collective preferences in the action arena in 
question (Scharpf, 1997 in Ostrom, 2005:39). 
Regarding participants‟ cognitive structures, they can be more or less explicit. Yet it is 
assumed that the rationality of the individual is limited. The individuals in the decision 
making process are presumed to be “intendedly rational” (March, 1994:9), in the sense that 
they tend to act in ways they believe will make them better off and therefore are goal oriented. 
Using the bounded rationality approach would prevent us from making unrealistic 
expectations about individuals‟ calculation capabilities, which is consistent with the IAD 
framework (Ostrom, Gardner and Walker, 1994). Moreover, it is assumed that actors have 
preferences but they do not have to be consistent nor unambiguous throughout the process in 
these preferences. In the same manner, it is assumed that individuals can attempt to be 
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problem-solving oriented but fail, or they can simply not be aiming at effectiveness at all but, 
as James March (1994) would argue, at creating a socially recognisable meaning out of their 
actions. Last but not least, it is assumed that individual preferences may have a varying level 
of ideological or value-based match with value-infused elements found in what Ostrom‟s 
exogenous variables denote, primarily in community attributes (e.g. culture) and rules. 
Action situation 
 
The participants in an action situation interact. The nature of this interaction is defined be a set 
of variables (Figure 2.2): positions, potential outcomes, the action-outcome linkages, the 
control that a participant has in regard to this function, the information, and finally the costs 
and benefits assigned to action and outcomes (Ostrom, 2005:32). 
Positions. Positions are the connecting link between participants and actions (Ostrom, 
2005:41). As participants can consist of one or more individuals, positions can be occupied by 
one or more participants (and thus by one or more individuals) and depending on the situation 
itself, the number of positions can be fewer than the number of participants. Ostrom also 
defines “the standing” of a participant in a particular action situation which refers to “the set 
of authorized actions and limits on actions that the holder of the position can take at particular 
choice sets in the situations” (Ostrom, 2005:41). In the case of legislature, the standing 
position of participants is to debate and vote. Also, participants can or cannot control their 
own entry into or exit from a position, which, as Ostrom suggests, affects the action situation 
and its outcomes. For instance, if participants can control their exit from the action situation, 
they are authorised to debate, vote and exit, which can have different outcomes if compared to 
the situation where they can only debate and vote (or only debate). Other scenarios are also 
possible, such as that some participants can affect the standing position of other participants. 
For instance, a participant A can have a say in whether a participant B can vote or not on a 
particular issue. 
Potential outcomes. Outcomes refer to the combination of a physical outcome and the value 
participants assign to that outcome. This “utility value”, as Ostrom phrases it, is the position 
an outcome has in the ranking of preferences the participants have, e.g. along the scale from 
the most preferred to the least preferred consequences of their actions (Ostrom, 2005:42). For 
example, two participants could assign different value to the same outcome, and act 
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accordingly, i.e. one participant could assign high value to a financial benefit and therefore act 
towards achieving it, while the other could assign no value to it and act toward achieving a 
different kind of reward. Outcomes can as well be unintended, as the participants can 
sometimes have limited or imperfect information on the factors of relevance (Ostrom, 
2005:43; March, 1994). Also, the result of an action situation can as well be a status quo 
outcome, meaning that at the end of the action situation no variable has undergone a change in 
its value.  
 
Figure 2.2 The internal structure and rules of an action situation (Ostrom, 2005) 
 
Action-outcome linkages. Participants at any stage in the decision making process choose 
from a set of actions. In a particular situation, individuals make choices in line with their own 
beliefs about the opportunities and constraints of that situation. Ostrom also argues that 
participants choose those actions which they estimate will affect the outcome variable in the 
way participants desire. Action-outcome linkages can be certain, risky or uncertain, depending 
on the structural aspects of the situation and not on the information a participant has about the 
situation (Ostrom, 2005:49). For instance, when a linkage is certain every action available is 
linked with only one outcome, unlike the risky in which the number of linkages can be more 
than one. Yet, Ostrom argues, most formal games are known for uncertainty, as probability of 
certain actions and their leading to certain outcomes is unknowable. 
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Control. Participants can have varying degrees of control over an action-outcome linkage, 
from absolute to almost none. Ostrom links the concept of control to the concepts of 
opportunity (described above) and power, where power entails “the opportunity times the 
extent of control” (2005:50). By this logic, a participant can have a high level of control but a 
small degree of power if the opportunity is small. In other words, in order that a participant is 
viewed as highly powerful both opportunity and control need to be high on the scale. The 
degree of control, power and opportunity can vary among participants in one action situation 
and this depends on the action situation itself. Similarly, the degree of control, power and 
opportunity of one participant can vary in different action situations. 
Information. Participants in an action situation can have complete or incomplete information 
over the action situation, i.e. the number of participants, the positions, the outcomes, the 
linkages, the actions available, the control and information other participants have, as well as 
costs and benefits (Ostrom, 2005:50). It can be assumed that all participants have complete 
information, i.e. are completely familiar with who are the participants, what moves they can 
draw, what information they all have at their disposal and so on. However, in real life 
situations this is probably never the case, as participant rarely have information on other 
participants‟ past actions or their cognitive structure, which means that the information 
participants have is almost as a rule incomplete. Once it is assumed that information is 
incomplete, what kind of information participants actually have in every situation becomes 
very important for how they take action. 
Costs and benefits. Depending on their actions, participants can be rewarded or sanctioned. 
Costs and benefits are cumulative, says Ostrom (2005:52). As indicated above, Ostrom makes 
a distinction between a physical outcome, an external reward or sanction and the value a 
participant assigns to their combination. She also introduces a concept of intrinsic valuation 
associated with an external reward or sanction which refers to the internal value participants 
attach to benefits and costs. These intrinsic valuations can be positive (pride, joy) or negative 
(shame, guilt) and measuring these valuations is considered extremely challenging. 
Exogenous variables 
 
Ostrom distinguishes between three types of exogenous variables: biophysical and material 
conditions, community attributes and rules. All three are briefly introduced here. 
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Biophysical and material conditions. The importance of biophysical and material conditions 
depends on the nature and types of settings (Ostrom, 2005:22). As IAD framework is based 
on common-pool resources studies, in which e.g. the size, position and mobility of resource 
are of key relevance for the action arena, biophysical and material conditions are seen as 
important exogenous variables in such settings. However, the biophysical conditions of Serbia 
as a country are not expected to be of any significant relevance for the HE system and also for 
the decision making that is analysed here. Therefore, instead of analysing the attributes of the 
physical world, the idea is to take the social, economic and political context in which Serbian 
HE system operates and by which it is affected as the type of exogenous variable which seems 
to be the closest to the material and biophysical conditions of Ostrom‟s common-pool 
resources. 
Attributes of community. Ostrom lists the following attributes of a community affecting an 
action arena: values of behaviour accepted (culture); the level of common understanding 
about certain types of action arenas; the level of homogeneity in the preferences found among 
those populating the community; the size and composition of the community; and the extent 
of inequality among the members of the community. In the case of decision making in the 
context of higher education, the community refers to the HE system in Serbia. Whereas the 
attributes are the size of the system (enrolments, number of HEIs, etc.), the organisation and 
governance, its HE institutions and their place in the system, the financing of HE in Serbia, as 
well as the culture, value system and shared preferences among the members of the 
community. It is of importance to note that participants in the action arena are at the same 
time a part of the community, i.e. the HE system in Serbia. 
It is also important to distinguish between the social, economic and political context, on one 
side, and the community attributes, on the other. The former refers to the world which is 
external to the HE system, while the latter refers to the HE itself. 
Rules. Rules are arguably one of the most complex social phenomena to conceptualise. It is a 
central concept in the body of work on institutions and its meaning is by and large differently 
understood. They also do not have to be visible nor understood as rules by everyone and in the 
same fashion. Some rules are written in laws and their breaking often provokes punishment, 
while some “go without saying”, though these can as well bring costs upon an individual if 
breached. To the former Ostrom refers as the rules-in-form, while the latter are rules-in-use. 
Rules vary across action arenas and even across action situations in the same arena, thus, they 
31 
 
tend not to be constant. Moreover, their susceptibility to human effect varies, in the sense that 
some are more deeply embedded in a social or cognitive structure, while some are more 
transient in their nature. Apart from being a vague concept, rules are also a broad concept and 
are a challenge in terms of recognition and classification. Within the IAD framework, rules 
are organised according to their direct impact on an action situation (2005:22). Ostrom puts 
forward the following types of working rules: 
 Entry and exit rules (or boundary rules) determine who can enter or leave an action 
arena and how this decision is made and this is linked to the attributes required of 
participants. For instance, a person can participate in decision making if chosen by a 
particular organisation. 
 Position rules prescribe what positions there are to be taken by different participants. It 
is also possible that in one action arena only one position is available and all the 
participants interact on the same level, as equal members of a decision making entity. 
 Choice or authority rules define what a participant in a particular position must, must 
not or may do, in other words, what choices of action are at his disposal. 
 Scope rules define which outcome variables must, must not or may be affected as a 
result of actions taken in the action situation. For instance, if we speak of decision 
making, the scope of action refers to what the participants must decide about, what 
they must not, and what they may decide about. 
 Aggregation rules are present when participants at multiple positions decide over the 
same action variable. They specify the responsibility over an action, i.e. who 
participates in the concrete choice, how much weight each participant will have in 
relation to others and how these different weights are calculated into a single aggregate 
choice. 
 Information rules determine what information participants in particular roles must, 
must not or may communicate to other participants in particular roles at particular 
points in the decision process. 
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 Lastly, payoff rules specify the costs and benefits assigned to particular outcomes, 
meaning that they tell us of what sanctions and rewards the participants are liable to 
once particular outcomes are realised. 
These rules are linked to corresponding elements in the action situation, as given in Figure 
2.2. Nevertheless, rules do not always exist in relation to all elements of an action situation 
(Ostrom, 2005). It is also distinguished between the rules which participants themselves create 
(internally generated rules) and those which are created externally (externally generated 
rules). 
2.2.2 Linking action arenas 
 
The ability to link multiple levels of action is a key asset of the Institutional Analysis and 
Development framework. However, although IAD framework acknowledges multiple levels 
of decision making, it does not limit researcher to conducting a multitier analysis, but rather 
permits the freedom to focus on a particular level, as well as on a particular elements of the 
framework. 
Analysing linked arenas is closer to reality than analysing a single arena, as “social reality is 
composed of multiple arenas linked sequentially or simultaneously” and action situations are 
rarely found independent of each other (Ostrom, 2005:55). Hence, interactions are repeated 
and individual participants‟ tend to perceive them as such. Ostrom distinguishes between 
three levels at which situations can be placed (see Figure 2.3): 
 Constitutional-choice situations 
 Collective-choice situations 
 Operational situations 
 
The rules generated at the constitutional level affect collective-choice situations, while the 
rules made in collective-choice situations affect the operational situations. Ostrom phrases this 
as follows: “All rules are nested in another set of rules that define how the first set of rules can 
be changed. [...] What can be done at a higher level will depend on the capabilities and limits 
of the rules at that level and at a deeper level” (2005:58). She therefore distinguishes between 
three levels of rules and refers to them as operational rules, collective-choice rules and 
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constitutional rules, depending on the level of situations which they affect (not at which they 
are generated)
5
. 
Operational rules are the easiest to change and they affect day-to-day decisions made. 
Collective-choice rules change more slowly and they affect operational activities and 
determine who is eligible to be a participant and how operational rules are changed. 
Constitutional-choice rules determine who can participate in collective-choice decision 
making and how operational-choice rules are altered. These change at the slowest pace. 
 
Figure 2.3 Levels of analysis and outcomes (adapted from Ostrom, 2005) 
 
                                               
5 NOTE: These three levels of rules are not to be confused with the types of rules presented in 2.2.1 which can be 
either generated either at the level beyond the actual action situation (externally generated) or within the action 
situation (internally generated). 
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2.3 Operationalisation 
 
As presented in Chapter 1, the subject of this research is the decision making process within 
the scope of drafting the 2005 Law on Higher Education, on provisions related to governance 
at the system and institutional levels. The idea of the new legal framework was initiated by 
the 2001-2004 Government of Serbia, i.e. most notably by its Ministry of Education and 
Sports, and it was further developed through several phases until the law was adopted by the 
Government and subsequently passed by the National Assembly in 2005. Here, the decision 
making process (the process throughout the text) refers to one of the phases in the preparation 
of the final version of the draft law, i.e. the four working groups hereby identified which at 
different points contributed to the final draft. It is important to note that the thematic scope of 
the law-drafting activity was much broader than analysed here, as the content of decision 
making were other HE issues as well, not solely governance. However, as the focus of this 
research is external and internal governance, the issues which go beyond this thematic scope 
are not analysed, unless they are of significant importance to the decision making on 
governance. 
Put against the IAD framework, the research problem presented in the first chapter gets a 
more defined contour in which action situations, participants, interactions, outcomes, 
evaluation and external factors are linked in a logical manner. Nevertheless, it is important to 
add that for the purpose of this study the IAD framework has been adapted to the specificities 
of the subject matter, though keeping its main elements and following the logic of the 
framework. 
This decision making process represents the main unit of analysis, yet the study is focused on 
external and internal governance decision making within the frame of drafting the 2005 Law 
on HE and not on the entire subject matter of the legislative process. Therefore, some aspects 
of governance arrangements (in particular at the level of institutions) are not included in this 
study, regardless of their relevance for the HE system or a HE institution, as they were not 
decided upon in the decision making process here in question. 
As shown in Table 2.1 below, the decision making process under study is positioned at the 
collective-choice tier in each of the four working structures (hereby termed “working groups”) 
identified to been crucial to the decision making. However, the action situations at the 
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constitutional and other levels are not of our prime interest, as the scenarios for the 
transformations of governance arrangements developed at the collective-choice level of the 
decision making. To illustrate, the first constitutional situation is the one in which the 2002 
“rules of the game” were determined by the National Council for the Development of 
University Education by appointing a working structure to prepare a concept of the future 
legal framework for HE. This working group is in turn the action situation at the collective-
choice level of rules. As shown in Table 2.1, four different working groups are identified to be 
involved in the decision making process at this level: WG-2003-1, WG-2003-2, WG-2003-3, 
WG-2004-1, one following the other throughout 2003 and 2004. The outcome of these 
groups‟ work would be the framework for legally arranging governance relationships in the 
Serbian HE system (operational level), which was, once the last group (WG-2004-1) finished 
its work, passed to the Government and the Parliament for adoption. It is assumed that HE 
decision making within all four working groups was affected by the workings of various 
exogenous variables, such as rules, culture, material aspects etc., as foreseen by the IAD 
framework. 
 Constitutional situations Collective-choice situations 
W
G
-2
0
0
3
-1
 
26.12.2002. The National Council for the 
Development of the University Education 
appointed a working group to work out a 
basis for higher education reforms in Serbia. 
 This working group (WG 2003-1) met 
from January until March 2003 and, 
among other issues, discussed governance 
arrangements; 
 The group gathered the state 
representatives and the academic 
community representatives. 
W
G
-2
0
0
3
-2
 10.03.2003. The Extraordinary meeting of 
the National Council was held to revise the 
composition and working rules of WG 2003-
1. WG-2003-1 was enlarged with 4 
additional representatives of UniBG and 3 
students. 
 This working group (WG 2003-2) met 
from April until July 2003 and, among 
other issues, discussed governance 
arrangements; 
 The group gathered the state 
representatives, the academic community 
representatives and student 
representatives. 
W
G
-2
0
0
3
-3
 
16.09.2003. The Council of the UniBG 
appointed its own group for developing 
amendments to the Ministry‟s draft (WG 
2003-3). 
 This working group (WG 2003-3) met 
from September 2003 until April 2004;  
 The group gathered representatives of the 
University of Belgrade. 
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W
G
-2
0
0
4
-1
 September 2004. The Ministry asked for the 
enlargement of the WG 2003-3 with 
representatives of other universities and 
students. The Ministry‟s instructions were 
followed which lead to the establishment of 
the fourth WG. 
 
 This working group (WG 2004-1) met in 
November and December 2004; 
 The group gathered representatives of the 
state, the academic community and 
students. 
 
Table 2.1 Two levels of the decision making process. 
The individual participants in working groups (i.e. action situations) are organised in three 
groups or teams whose team status is hereby identified as the state (or the government), the 
academic community and the students. Here the state refers to all individuals in the decision 
making process representing the Government (in the case of Serbia, this, almost as a rule, 
refers to the ministry responsible for higher education), the academic community (sometime 
referred to as academics) to all individuals in the decision making process representing higher 
education institutions, and the students to all individuals in the decision making process 
representing students. However, the teams tend to be more or less heterogeneous, while the 
level of their diversity varies throughout the process. Due to this reason, even though here 
introduced as teams, participants are also approached as individuals or even sub-teams and 
this depends on a particular situation. The number of participants depends on the concrete 
situation and was not stable throughout the process (see Appendix 5). For the sake of clarity, 
individuals are hereby termed participants, while the state, academics and students (as groups 
of individuals representing one of the three stakeholders) are termed actors. 
The three identified actors are not to be confused with positions, which are the connecting link 
between actors/participants and actions in an action situation. For instance, in an action 
situation the positions available could be the chair, members with a right to vote, members 
without voting right etc. The position of the member with the voting right can be populated by 
both academics and students, for instance. Positions are relevant in the sense that they define 
the set of allowed moves an actor/participant can make and therefore they limit the action and 
make it more predictable. They also tell us of the information at actor/participants‟ disposal 
and their control over the action-outcome linkages tied to their positions. For example, 
working group members (i.e. a participant in an action situation) at the same position are 
expected to have the same information and level of control over the potential outcomes. 
However, as this is rarely the case, in this study positions will be approached in a more 
specific manner. In other words, if there are indications that in an action situation participants 
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at the same formal position have significantly varying level of control over the action-
outcome linkages they will be assigned a different position, as they have a different standing, 
regardless of the fact that they formally occupy the same position as a participant with more 
limited control, for instance. In concrete, a representative of the Government could have more 
information and more control over the action-outcome linkage than a student, even though 
both occupy the same position (e.g. a member) in the working group. 
Within every action situation actors and participants interact. In a decision making process 
their interaction leads to joint decisions in the form of outcomes. However, the patterns of 
interaction do not always have to be visible in a concrete formal situation. Some participants 
can interact in an informal setting, outside the formal setting, without the knowledge of 
others. Moreover, the nature of interaction among the same participants can vary, depending 
on the setting, or the presence or absence of some other participants, etc. For instance, 
representatives of the academic community could informally meet and discuss possible 
actions, without informing either the state representatives or students. This could happen even 
between some individuals from the student and some from the academic community group, 
while other individuals pertaining to these groups might not be involved or informed. All 
these can affect the outcome of the decision making and are therefore taken into 
consideration. 
Interactions inside action situations result in outcomes in the form of joint decisions, which 
does not have to be evaluated in the same way by all the participants. For instance, a working 
group can decide on a matter, however, not all the members of the group have to agree on the 
decision. This can result in, e.g. placing the issue on the agenda of another, perhaps differently 
composed, working group and attempting to amend the previously taken decision. 
As for the biophysical conditions, these would refer to the social, economic and political 
context in which Serbian HE system operates and with which it interacts, both by being 
affected by it and by having an effect on it. They have been introduced in chapter 1.2. With 
regards to the attributes of community, they refer to the attributes of the HE system in Serbia, 
such as the size of the system, the organisation and governance, its HE institutions, their size 
and place in the system, the financing of HE in Serbia, as well as the culture, value system 
and shared preferences among the members of the community. As regards the rules, it is 
distinguished between the collective-choice rules (coming from the constitutional-level 
decision making), on one hand, and the rules generated inside the collective-choice situation, 
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by the participants themselves, on the other. Both types of rules are linked to the 
corresponding components of an action situation, as given in 2.2.1 (Figure 2.2). The former 
are related to the situation level they are generated at, while the latter are assigned to the 
components they regulate in an action situation (Figure 2.2). 
Figure 2.4 represents the analytical framework, combining the elements from the Ostrom‟s 
IAD framework given in figures 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3. Action situation WG-2003-2 is used as an 
example.  
 
Figure 2.4 The framework for analysing the research problem 
The inside of the action situation is populated by the state, the academics and student 
participants who interact and produce joint outcome of that interaction. While doing so they 
are affected by three groups of exogenous variables, namely, the political, economic and 
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social context of Serbia (biophysical and material conditions in Ostrom‟s framework), various 
aspects of the HE system (community attributes) and the rules, which can be generated 
outside the action situation or inside, by participants themselves. The internal structure of 
every action situation differs in terms of which actors and participants are involved, what 
positions they occupy and what actions they take, what kind of information and control they 
have, what participants‟ individual or group characteristics and preferences are, how they 
evaluate outcomes, as well as how benefits and costs are calculated in terms of the potential 
outcomes. Although all these elements are not included in the diagram, for clarity reasons, 
they are given attention in analysing the decision making process. 
Finally, with respect to governance transformations, the interaction among the actors is 
expected to take place in various thematic arenas, belonging to external and internal 
governance, which shall be indentified in the next chapter. It is by following these thematic 
arenas (topics) that the research problem will be addressed. 
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3 Research methodology 
 
This chapter introduces the research design and data collection methods, followed by some 
considerations over validity and reliability of research findings and finally by limitations of 
the research. 
3.1 Research design and data collection method 
 
The research is designed as a social science qualitative research focusing on decision making 
processes in determining higher education governance changes in a post-socialist country. 
Having a legislative decision making process as the primary focus of this research, the 
disciplinary approach chiefly assumed is political science, with which the IAD framework 
introduced in the previous chapter is consistent. In support to this statement, it is argued that 
the state-level decision making on governance arrangements in any particular sector (HE in 
this case) belongs to the political science discourse (Peters, 2001; Pierre, 2000). 
The data used in this study was collected by using two techniques, namely, documentary 
analysis and in-depth, semi-structured interviews. Given the fact that this study generates 
findings from so-called “soft” data, it is bound to be more interpretivist then positivist, from 
the epistemological point of view. 
The documentary analysis is based on the analysis of the secondary data. These include 
system-level and institutional-level regulatory documents (both working and final versions), 
notes from meetings related to the decision making process (those that were accessible), 
related correspondence and official statements, as well as related publications, reports and 
studies. The body of documents analysed also includes those containing quantitative and 
qualitative data related to the topics discussed and other various texts which were found to be 
relevant. They are all included in the list of references. 
Interviews were envisaged for generating primary data on the phenomenon under study. They 
were conducted with key actors in the decision making process in question: members of the 
academic community, representatives from the ministry responsible for higher education and 
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students. In total, ten interviews were conducted, out of which two (three)
6
 were Ministry 
representatives, five (four) were members of the academic community and three were 
students. Apart from selecting them on the basis of which the three actors in the decision 
process they represented, the interviewees were also chosen on the basis of how active they 
were as representatives of the state, the academic community and students in that process, as 
well as what their position inside their respective institutions or organisations was, giving 
priority to those on leadership positions. The rationale for these lies in the assumption that 
leaders and more active participants posses more information on the actual conditions and the 
relationships in the decision making arena. They were also the ones who were more likely to 
influence the direction of the decision process and thus have a better insight into the rationale 
behind some of the actions. 
The interviewing took place in February and March 2010. The interviews were conducted in 
person, recorded, transcribed and to a very limited extent coded, as the interviews were 
envisaged as semi-structured. One of the interviews (from the academic community group) 
conducted in person had to be made short (not more than 20 minutes), due to the time 
limitations of the interviewee, in which case only the crucial questions were asked. One of the 
informants was acting both as an academic community representative and as a state 
representative, due to the fact that the person, being a university professor, was at one point in 
the process appointed to a high position in the Ministry. Interview questions in this case were 
posed in such a way that the interviewee could distinguish between the two roles. All 
interviewees are anonymous. All interviews were conducted in Serbian and transcribed as 
such. For the purpose of quoting, parts of the interviews were translated into English. The 
interview guide and the list of interviewees by description of their positions and roles in the 
decision making are included at the end of the thesis document (Appendices 1 and 2). The 
interview guide was not always strictly followed, due to the semi-structured nature of the 
interviewing and the need to probe whenever it was considered necessary. The average 
duration of interviews was about 60 minutes. 
Within this research, primary and secondary data are triangulated against each other for the 
purpose of the higher credibility of observations (Ary et al, 2009; Babbie, 2009; Marshall and 
Rossman, 2006).  
                                               
6 The number in brackets indicates that one of the interviewees was participating in the process both as a ministry 
representative and the academic community representative, however, not simultaneously. 
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3.2 Reliability and validity 
 
The issues of validity and reliability of research primarily come from the positivist paradigm 
(Winter, 2000) and are therefore more associated with quantitative research (Grix, 2004). Yet, 
as qualitative studies are in need of objectivity as much as quantitative ones are, both validity 
and reliability are seen as relevant to the approach and are therefore discussed here (Kirk and 
Miller, 1986; Padget, 1998; Thyer, 2009). Nevertheless, Kirk and Miller (1986) argue that as 
perfect validity is not even theoretically attainable, social science research tends to rely to a 
far great extent on ensuring reliability of observations, even though mechanisms for securing 
higher validity of qualitative research is constantly pursued (Maxwell, 1992). It would be 
important to note that there are some disagreements on the exact meaning of both of the 
concepts (Maxwell, 1992; Winter, 2000), but due to the limited nature of this research they 
are not discussed here. 
3.2.1 Reliability 
 
Reliability refers to whether a particular research technique applied to the same phenomenon 
would yield the same results after repeated by several researchers (Kirk and Miller, 1986; 
Babbie, 2009). Thyer (2009) defines reliability in qualitative research as the extent to which 
the set of meanings coming from different researchers are sufficiently congruent. He further 
suggests that in order to increase reliability of the qualitative data researchers can have it 
second coded which, means that more than one researcher is coding the data which are 
afterwards compared for mutual agreement. As the data has been coded only to a limited 
extent and as second coding is a labour-intensive activity which would involve more than one 
researcher it goes beyond the scope of this thesis and has not been considered an option. 
The fact that the interviews were recorded and literally transcribed, accompanied by the 
written description of the interview settings is expected to increase reliability. In addition, the 
fact of the matter that most of the questions were posed to all the interviewees (with variations 
coming from the differences in their official positions in the decision process and which 
particular phase(s) of the process they were involved in) should also increase the reliability. 
Last but not least, in conducting the interviews the interview guide was to a great extent 
adhered to, which would add to the reliability of the data. 
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3.2.2 Validity 
 
Kirk and Miller (1986:69) define validity in qualitative research as whether the empirical 
measure properly mirrors the actual meaning of a phenomenon or “whether or not the 
researcher is calling what is measured by the right name”. It is also referred to as, truthfulness 
or trustworthiness, as some qualitative researchers find the definition of validity in 
quantitative research inapplicable to a qualitative setting (e.g. Guba and Lincoln, 1989). 
Without going into different types of it, validity is analysed as a concept which is subject to a 
certain level of threat during conducting research. Padgett (1998) groups all threats to 
credibility and trustworthiness into three broad categories: reactivity, researcher‟s biases and 
respondent‟s biases. 
Reactivity refers to “potentially distorting effects of the qualitative researcher‟s presence in 
the field” (Padgett, 1998:92) which might arise while conducting interviews. As the 
interviews are focusing on past events, no threat exists that the interviewer (researcher) is 
interfering with the actual situations under study. Nonetheless, as it is the case in this research, 
some of the interviewees were acquainted with the researcher beforehand and the 
interviewees‟ associations (with which the researcher is not familiar) might have had an effect 
on the interviewees‟ attitude and responses. However, this was very difficult to both measure 
and prevent. It is seen as an objective threat to validity, but is in this case almost impossible to 
reduce. 
Researcher‟s biases refer to the possibility that the researcher is influenced by preconceptions 
and opinions he or she has about the object of study. This in concrete means that the 
researcher could deliberately choose informants who will support their research expectations 
or ask some questions while ignoring the less favoured ones, or even ignore data which does 
not support conclusions (Padgett, 1998). As it was already mentioned, the interviewees were 
selected on the basis of the level of their involvement in all the phases of the decision making 
process, with the aim to interview the most involved and therefore likely the most informed 
ones. Moreover, interviewees‟ availability and readiness to participate in the research was also 
taken into consideration, although much choice in this respect was not left to the researcher. 
Regarding the interview questions, they were drafted in such a way as to best answer the 
research question(s). As for the data interpretation, this issue is covered in Chapter 4. 
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Respondent‟s biases are unfortunately one point where the bias is most difficult to either 
recognise or prevent. Respondents may “withhold information and even lie to protect their 
privacy or to avoid revealing some unpleasant truths” or give answers they assume the 
researcher wants to hear (Padgett, 1992:92). Another possible threat in this category which is 
not mentioned by Padgett could arise due to the time distance between the moment of 
interviewing and the period in which the decision making studied took place (5-10 years). 
This in particular refers to the notion that during the interviews it was particularly difficult to 
know whether an interviewee remembers an event correctly or not. Although some would 
indicate whether they recalled or not, this was likely not always the case. Furthermore, 
interviewees‟ responses are mere perceptions of reality, or, to be more precise, of what they 
believed to have been the reality with respect to the issues they talked about in the interviews. 
Last but not least, they might also have rationalised their actions in the light of what happened 
and how the reality, as they perceived it, changed between the moment of the situations 
analysed and the actual moment of conducting the interview. Even though the data collected 
by using this technique is not treated as a presentation of the objective reality, but as 
perceptions of that reality, there is a threat to the credibility of research. In order to reduce this 
threat, all interviews started by the interviewer making the same introduction about the nature 
and scope of the study.  
Finally, as already mentioned, the primary data (interviews) is methodologically triangulated 
with the secondary data (documents) for the purposes of increasing both reliability and 
validity of the research (Denzin, 1970; Marshall and Rossman, 2006). 
3.3 Limitations 
 
A few words on limitations need to be said. Two types of limitations are set forth: the 
limitations encountered in conducting research and the limitations of the study as a whole. 
The major limitation encountered during this research was the time given for completing the 
master thesis which is about four months. Another limitation is concerned with the 
accessibility of secondary data. Even though the most important documents were available on 
the Internet and collected through personal contacts of the researcher, there were still some 
which could not be accessed for technical or other reasons. Last but not least, due to the time 
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constraint, not more than ten interviews have been conducted, which is considered a limiting 
factor. 
It is also important to state that this research does not aim at generalising on the characteristics 
of actors which were under study. It would be important to note that some of the citations and 
interpretations do not necessarily reflect the worldview of all the members of either academic 
community, students and student organisations or state authorities. As it was already indicated 
in the section on validity, due to a time distance between the time when the decision making 
took place and the moment of interviewing, some of the observations might not be valid to the 
present day. 
Finally, all the observations, interpretations and generalisations made in this thesis belong to 
the author. Likewise, all mismanagements and mistakes associated with the research are the 
sole responsibility of the author. 
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4 Description and analysis of the 
decision making process 
 
This chapter is dedicated to the decision making process leading to the changes in governance 
arrangements brought about by the 2005 Law on Higher Education. These transformations 
cover both the system and institutional level, the latter being studied solely as given by the 
law, not individual HEIs acts, as this is part of other decision making processes and goes 
beyond the scope of our study. The decision making herewith analysed is a part of a broader 
decision making, as given in the analytical framework (Figure 2.4). This particular set of 
situations is assumed to be the most important one, as this is where the direction of change 
was set, while those coming later in the legislative process, i.e. the decision making by the 
Government and eventually by the National Assembly, to a great extent confirmed the already 
chosen version of the draft law, in particular when it comes to the provisions regarding 
governance. 
The chapter starts with introducing the context and the content of the decision making, 
followed by the description of the exogenous variables, namely, social, political and economic 
factors of the country, the factors pertaining to the HE system and eventually the rules. Once 
these are presented, the decision making is described and analysed. In principle, this is 
approached through three hereby identified thematic arenas related to external and internal 
governance. These are: 
 Arena 1: external governance  
 Arena 2: internal governance 
 Arena 3: university integration 
 
Within each of the arenas, four action situations, in this case four working groups, have been 
identified to have been crucial to the actor interaction within these arenas. They are referred to 
as WG 2003-1, WG 2003-2, WG 2003-3 and WG 2004-1 and they followed each other in 
time sequence. Table 4.1 gives basic information on these working groups. 
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 Working groups (collective-choice situations) 
W
G
 2
0
0
3
-1
 
 
 Appointed by the National Council for the Development of University Education in 
January 2003; 
 Active from January until March 2003; 
 The group gathered the state representatives (8) and the academic community 
representatives (10); 
 Aim: to prepare a concept on the basis of which the Ministry was to prepare the draft 
law; 
 The aim was not achieved as the University of Belgrade objected the composition of 
the group; 
 Output: minor amendments to the Ministry‟s Reform Concept. 
 
W
G
 2
0
0
3
-2
 
 
 Appointed by the National Council for the Development of University Education in 
March 2003; 
 Active from April until July 2003; 
 The group gathered the state representatives (8), the academic community 
representatives (14) and student representatives (3); 
 Aim: to prepare a concept on the basis of which the Ministry was to prepare the draft 
law; 
 The aim was achieved, however, some academic community representatives disproved 
of results; 
 Output: the Reform Concept agreed upon by the WG. 
 
J
u
ly
 2
0
0
3
 
 The National Council for the Development of University Education adopted the draft 
of the WG 2003-2. 
S
ep
t.
 2
0
0
3
 
 The Ministry published the first draft of the law, soon to be followed by the second, 
slightly, amended version (December 2003); 
 This draft law never reached the next stage in the legislative process (adoption by the 
Government) due to the parliamentary elections set for December 2003. 
W
G
 2
0
0
3
-3
 
 
 Appointed by the Academic Council of the University of Belgrade in September 2003; 
 Active from September 2003 until April 2004; 
 The group gathered representatives of the University of Belgrade (13); 
 Aim: to amend the Ministry‟s draft; 
 The aim was achieved; 
 Output: the draft law on HE finalised by the University of Belgrade WG. 
 
A
p
ri
l 
2
0
0
4
 
 UniBG Council adopted the draft prepared by the WG 2003-3; 
 This draft law never reached the next stage in the legislative process (adoption by the 
Government). 
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W
G
 2
0
0
4
-1
 
 
 Appointed by the Ministry of Education and Sports in October 2004; 
 Active in November and December 2004; 
 The group gathered representatives of the state, the academic community and student 
representatives; 
 Aim: to prepare the final version of the draft; 
 The aim was achieved; 
 Output: the final draft was agreed by the WG. 
 
A
u
g
u
st
 
2
0
0
5
 
 The Law on Higher Education was passed. 
Table 4.1 Working groups of the decision making process 
Interestingly, not all groups were appointed by the same constitutional-level structure and 
were thus legitimised in different ways. While the first two groups were appointed by the 
National Council, the third group was legitimised solely through UniBG internal decision 
making structures. However, the interviewed members of the group considered it legitimate, 
mainly due to the fact that the University of Belgrade was the oldest and the largest of the 
universities in Serbia (BG1, 2010; BG2, 2010; BG3, 2010; MA1, 2010; NS1, 2010). The 
fourth group was, in effect, the third group enlarged by the representatives (mainly Rectors) 
from other universities and student representatives, only now officially appointed by the 
Ministry. The list of actors and participants in the decision making process is given in 
Appendix 5. 
4.1 Description: the context 
 
In 2000, after a decade of political, economic and social isolation, the socialist regime was 
overthrown and a new government was in place. Economic recovery and political stability 
became major aims of the newly elected democratic government, while the ambition to join 
the European Union became one of the main items on the Government‟s political agenda. The 
Government was announcing major reforms in all fields. In 2003, Serbian minister 
responsible for HE signed the Bologna Declaration, by which Serbia officially joined the 
process. 
During the decade-long period of isolation Serbian universities witnessed during 1990s, 
academics from various disciplines were part of informal networks in which they cooperated, 
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both as political activists, united against the regime, and as university professors discussing 
various university issues (Turajlić et al, 2004). Among such organisations were Uniforum and 
the Association of Professors and Researchers (Udruženje profesora i istraživača), and later 
the Alternative Academic Educational Network - AAEN (Alternativna akademska obrazovna 
mreža). One of the activates of AAEN was re-establishing connections with universities in 
other European countries and beyond and following international trends in HE (Turajlić et al, 
2004). After the last socialist government was removed from power, the Ministry responsible 
for HE was entrusted to a Democratic Party
7
 member, prof. Gašo Knežević, a member of 
AAEN, who, now as minister of education and sport, appointed prof. Srbijanka Turajlić 
assistant minister for higher education, one of the AAEN leaders.  
Straight from the outset, the Government‟s “reform” narrative was also present in HE, in 
particular with the new ministry in charge of HE. Some of the key problems the Serbian HE 
system encountered, as identified by the Ministry, were that the system was, as a result of a 
decade of isolation among other things, inefficient, underfunded, outdated and severely 
lagging behind the rest of Europe (Turajlić, Babić and Milutinović, 2001). Both the state and 
HEIs recognised the need to change something in the HE system in Serbia, as well as to make 
up for the decade spent in isolation and without much contact with other members of the 
European HE community (Turajlić, 2004). However, as it seems, not all sides saw eye to eye 
on what exactly needed to be changed and how (Turajlić et al, 2004). This was in particular 
visible in the relationship between the Ministry of Education and Sports and the academic 
community, most notably the University of Belgrade (ibid; MA1, 2010; ME2, 2010; BG2, 
2010; ST1, 2010; ST3, 2010). 
As part of the reforms, the Ministry envisaged a change in the architecture of the higher 
education system, primarily by introducing changes in the types and organisation of higher 
education institutions, as well as by introducing new structures at the system level which were 
expected to enhance the performance of the system, i.e. make it more effective and efficient. 
Put differently, the HE reforms and the change in policy were accompanied by some new 
thoughts related to governance arrangements, in particular on the side of the Government, as 
the existing, traditional governance model was not anymore considered fit for the increasingly 
                                               
7 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democratic_Party_(Serbia), retrieved on April 26, 2010 
50 
 
complex world of HE, which meant that alternatives needed to be explored (Turajlić, Babić 
and Milutinović, 2001). 
Between 2001 and 2003, prior to the appointment of the first working group, the Ministry of 
Education and Sports was very active in working on reform scenarios, learning from other 
countries‟ experiences, attending international events and organising local events where HE 
issues would be discussed and some problems offered solutions. The academic community 
was noted to be active in these discussions as well (ME1, 2010; ME2, 2010; NS1, 2010; ST1, 
2010; ST2, 2010). 
In 2002, in order to create legal conditions for HE reforms, the National Council for the 
Development of University Education put in place a working group with the task to create a 
basic concept for the future legal framework (herewith referred to as the Reform Concept). 
From the beginning of the process, the academic community and state representatives were 
the main actors, with student representatives joining at a later stage (as per WG 2003-2). As 
soon as the working group (WG 2003-2) had completed its work and the NCDUE adopted its 
Reform Concept, the Ministry prepared and published the first draft of the new legal 
framework for HE, now open to a public discussion (September 2003). However, as the 
parliamentary elections were announced, the law was not passed to the next stage of the 
legislative process. Immediately after the Reform Concept was published, the Council of the 
University of Belgrade, not being satisfied with the Ministry‟s draft, decided to appoint its 
own working group which would look into the draft and amend it as it deemed more suitable 
(WG 2003-3). Nevertheless, due to a longer period of transition between the two 
governments, the decision making process was on hold, while the UniBG group was working 
on its own amendments to the Ministry‟s draft law. 
In March 2004, the new minister of education was in the office, now coming from a 
differently oriented political party (Democratic Party of Serbia
8
) and with visibly less interest 
to interfere in HE affairs (ME1, 2010; ME3, 2010; BG3, 2010). Half a year later, in autumn 
2004, the minister resigned, to be replaced by a successor with more interest in passing the 
legal framework, but similar level of interest as its predecessor in dealing with the matter 
personally (MA1, 2010; BG3, 2010). It was due to this reason that in October 2004, the 
minister of education officially granted the mandate to the Rector of the University of 
                                               
8 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democratic_Party_of_Serbia, retrieved on April 26, 2010. 
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Belgrade to continue the work their group had already started, only with involving other 
universities and students in the process, in order to raise the level of legitimacy of the 
outcome. Immediately after this, the former member of the University of Belgrade Board and 
the chair of the UniBG working group (i.e. WG 2003-3) was appointed assistant minister for 
HE, with one of the main tasks to prepare the final draft of the law to be adopted by the 
Government. 
Finally, in August 2005, the Law on Higher Education was passed by the National Assembly, 
which created the legal conditions for HE reforms and also changes in governance.  
4.1.1 Exogenous variables 
 
As already described, the exogenous variables in this study refer to (1) social, political and 
economic factors, (2) the factors coming from the HE system in Serbia (size, enrolments and 
distribution, the number and size of HEIs, organisation and governance, financing, historical 
legacy, path dependence, and culture, beliefs and values) and (3) rules. All three are here 
analysed from two points of view, i.e. interviewees‟ perceptions of these factors and the 
interpretations of the researcher based on the findings. 
Social, political and economic factors 
 
The decision making in all three arenas was reported to have been affected by several 
phenomena external to the HE system itself and belonging to a wider context. 
Europeanisation. The pro-European political orientation of the 2001-2004 Government was 
noted to be present in the general HE policy approach of its Ministry of Education and Sports. 
Here, Europeanisation is primarily understood as “adapting national and sub-national systems 
of governance to a European political centre and European-wide norms” (Olsen, 2002:923). 
This is tightly linked to the fact that the “Bologna” agenda, aiming at creating European 
Higher Education Area, had been adopted by most European countries by 2002 and was as 
well an overarching policy in Serbian HE, even before Serbia officially joined the process 
(MoES, 2001; ME1, 2010; MA1, 2010; ME2, 2010; ST1, 2010; ST2, 2010; ST3, 2010). In 
2003, the minister signed the Bologna Declaration which further committed Serbia to this 
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intergovernmental agreement. The following government (2004-2007), although less agile in 
the field of education, continued on the same course (MA1, 2010).  
Resources. At the turn of the century the economy of the country was fragile, which also 
severely affected the public financing of HE and the welfare of HEIs in general. The limited 
resources available for HE urged those HEIs with a considerable income of their own (not 
allocated by the state) to be more protective of their status and property (ME2, 2010; BG1, 
2010; BG2, 2010; BG3, 2010; ST1, 2010; ST2, 2010; ST3, 2010). On the other hand, the 
question of resources was often raised in discussion on reforms, as the reforms were perceived 
to lead to considerable costs which HEIs were not prepared or willing to cover. Even though 
the Ministry put effort into providing donor assistance and raising awareness among Serbian 
HEIs of possibilities offered by international projects (ME2, 2010), the question of “who 
should pay for reforms” remained open. 
Democracy in development. Another political factor observed refers to the notion that after 
the political changes in 2000, democratic institutions in Serbia were in an early stage of 
development. Two of the interviewees noted that this made general trust in the state 
authorities rather weak (BG3, 2010; ST1, 2010). Besides, the lack of trust could also be noted 
towards the political motives of any government in place, simply because “it is a political 
option and, no matter which people are in it, it always strives to realise its goals in the field of 
higher education” (BG2, 2010)9. This, as perceived by the same interviewee, is infringement 
of university autonomy. 
Country’s political leadership. Some interviewees stated that the assassination of the Prime 
Minister in 2003, consequent elections and change in the Government affected the decision 
making process, in particular because it led to slowing down of the legislative process, as well 
as the change in the political party in charge of the Ministry of Education and Sports which 
ensued. While the first Ministry political personnel was more reform-oriented and in general 
more active in HE, the 2004-2007 Ministry was more reluctant to continue down the same 
path and likely confront the academia (ME1, 2010; MA1, 2010; ME2, 2010; BG1, 2010; 
BG3, 2010; ST1, 2010; ST2, 2010; ST3, 2010). Nevertheless, even the first Ministry, at one 
point in the process, started to relent the pressure on the universities, as “no authority wants to 
                                               
9 All excerpt quotations from the interviews were translated by the author of the thesis. 
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have the university against itself, since the university is very loud and very respected, while 
every government is transitory” (ME1, 2010). 
Higher education system in Serbia 
 
Financing. With regards to the factors coming from the HE system itself, all interviewees 
emphasised that HE financing, mostly referring to the state funding, is one of the important 
issues when it comes to deciding governance. The limited financial resources directed to HE 
are seen as crucial by some interviewees (BG2, 2010; BG3, 2010; NS1, 2010), while the 
manner in which these resources are distributed was not labelled problematic by any of the 
interviewees. What is more, it seems that financing of HE in Serbia is inextricably linked with 
institutional autonomy. Namely, the HE massification and the increase in demand for HE 
which started at the end of 1980s, led to the increase in enrolments in public HEIs, 
establishing of first private HEIs and more private contribution to HE, mostly provided by 
students through tuition fees. Ivošević and Miklavič (2009) referred to this phenomenon as 
“hidden privatisation”. However, not all universities and faculties increased enrolments and 
tuition fees at the same pace, as not all were equally attractive or equally eager to do so. In 
parallel, the state funding, however, did not follow this trend which was resolved through 
giving more financial autonomy to universities in terms of enrolments and setting tuition fees. 
In addition, many faculties had their own properties obtained through donations, dating 
mostly from the pre-World War II times, from which they could accumulate additional 
income (MA1, 2010). Therefore, the situation with respect to the financing at many faculties 
in Serbia at the turn of the century was rather diverse and this has not changed much until the 
present day (Babin and Lažetić, 2009). Moreover, а few interviewees indicated that a 
distinction can be made between “rich” and “poor” faculties and that this was directly linked 
with their positions with regards to HE governance, financing and their appreciation of the 
institutional autonomy in the decision making process (MA1, 2010; BG2, 2010; BG3, 2010; 
ST3, 2010; ST3, 2010). 
Institutional landscape. According to all interviewees, the number of students enrolled and 
the number of faculties in the first place, was a very important factor in the decision making 
process, and it was the key argument for the University of Belgrade to claim “a special 
treatment” in terms of the number of representatives in the first two working group (WG 
2003-1/2). Another argument supporting UniBG demands was that this university is the oldest 
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(MA1, 2010; BG1, 2010; BG2, 2010; BG3, 2010; ST1, 2010; ST2, 2010; ST3, 2010), the best 
(BG2; BG3; MA1) and all other universities in Serbia originated from this university. 
The University of Belgrade is, above all, a very old institution and it is also the central 
cultural institution in modern Serbia, practically since it was established 200 years 
ago [...] It is the main intellectual core of the country and it has to be protected as 
such. (BG2, 2010) 
Throughout the process, the role and position of this university proved to be indeed “central”. 
Another point of division was public vs. private HEIs, which were by the 2005 law recognised 
as equal in status and subject to the same “rules of the game”. Nonetheless, some of the 
interviewees pointed out their status in the decision making process was not the same (BG2, 
2010; BG3, 2010). In 2008, around 7% of all students in Serbia were enrolled in private HEIs 
(Ivošević and Miklavič, 2009), even though there were 7 private and 6 public universities in 
Serbia. In 2003 this percentage was even lower and there were fewer private HEIs
10
. 
Similarly, post-secondary vocational institutions, although regulated by the 2005 LoHE, were 
not enjoying the same status in the decision making as public universities, due to the fact that 
they were not part of the HE system before the law was passed (and during the decision 
making) and before they became accredited (BG3, 2010).  
History. Another external variable refers to the relationships in the past between the state and 
higher education, which was also mentioned in the previous section (Social, political and 
economic factors), although here it refers solely to the previous governance arrangements and 
authority distribution within the HE system. Here, two points are of relevance. The first point 
refers to the authoritarian regime and the state control with respect to higher education, in 
particular until the dissolution of SFRY, while the second refers to the law on University from 
1998, which has already been mentioned above as a most repressive legal measure employed 
against the university‟s political activism during 1990s and therefore a severe attack on its 
autonomy. Both are recognised by some of the interviewees to have had affected their 
preferences over the level of state involvement in HE governance at both system and 
                                               
10 Until LoHE was passed in 2005, there were many private faculties which were not part of any university. As 
the Law does not allow faculties to exist without being part of a university, many of these have joined and 
created private universities. In a similar manner, there were also private post-secondary institutions which, after 
they were accredited by the 2005 law, became vocational HEIs. 
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institutional level (BG2, 2010; BG3, 2010; MA1, 2010). Interestingly, some interviewees saw 
the 1990s primarily as a period of isolation of Serbian universities from the rest of the world 
(ME1, 2010; NS1, 2010), while others remember it mainly as a period of state repression and 
violation of university autonomy (BG1, 2010; BG2, 2010; BG3, 2010; ST1, 2010). 
Path dependence. It is also assumed that the scenarios for new governance arrangements are 
limited by the nature of the existing governance arrangements. As change is always seen as 
relative to the existing state of the art with regards to a certain matter, old governance 
arrangements function as another factor affecting the direction taken with regards to new 
governance. This “causal relevance of preceding stages in a temporal sequence” is in social 
sciences referred to as path dependence (Pierson, 2000:252). Put it simply, this means that 
events which took place at earlier points in time might affect the events at later points in time. 
Pierson asserts that although previous events do influence paths and outcomes, this does not 
mean that the trajectory will not change at a later point. This, in effect, can also indicate the 
relevance of the path taken at an earlier point, since it is assumed that “we cannot understand 
the significance of a particular social variable without understanding „how it got there‟ – the 
path it took” (Pierson, 2000:252). 
Relations among actors. The relationship between the actors after the democratic changes in 
2000 is also noted to have affected the action situation when it comes to governance. Namely, 
in the period between 2001 and 2003, before the first working group was appointed, HE 
reforms and Bologna process had been one of the most discussed matters among the interested 
parties. However, this was not experienced in the same way by everyone and not all parties to 
the matter were enthusiastic about reforms, rather on the contrary. An interviewee asserted 
that this also polarised the academic community, the Ministry and students into two groups: 
“the reformist” and “the conservatives” (BG1, 2010). The 2001-2004 Ministry, students and 
the University of Novi Sad were considered more reformist, while the leadership and some 
prominent scholars from the University of Belgrade more “conservative” (BG2, 2010; MA1, 
2010; ST2, 2010). As regards other participants in the decision making, they were noted for 
the tendency to align with either of the sides (MA1, 2010; ST2, 2010), depending on the 
context, which could indicate that they were more moderate in their positions and more 
reluctant to confront. Interestingly, the interviews conducted suggest that neither “reformists” 
nor “conservatives” were as extreme in their positions as the interviewees belonging to “the 
other side” would report. For instance, the Ministry‟s ambitions regarding reforms were 
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regarded as “an extreme-fundamentalist-Bolognist” (BG1, 2010), as well as “aggressive” and 
“reckless” (BG2, 2010), while this was not the impression of the researcher, based on the 
interview with the Ministry representatives. It would be important to reiterate that this could 
be due to time distance from the present moment. It could be, however, argued that the 
perception of the actors with a different attitude towards reforms could have acted as a factor 
in the decision making process. In concrete, if a university representative perceived the 
minister‟s reform plans as a potential threat to the university, it is likely that this university 
representative would see all actions of the Ministry in the light of this, regardless of how 
“threatening” they actually were. An interviewee argued that many university professors felt 
indeed threatened by the initial reform plans of the 2001-2004 Ministry, which affected the 
dialogue between the state and the academia in general (MA1, 2010). 
However, in autumn of 2003, as parliamentary elections became inevitable, the reform 
discussions were put on hold, even though the Ministry tried to prevent this situation from 
slowing down the decision making process (ME2, 2010). In the meantime, the University of 
Belgrade became occupied with the draft law and, according to some of the interviewed 
(ME1, 2010; ST2, 2010), rather privately and with little transparency, which meant that the 
decision making process was in that period practically taking place “within the walls” of the 
University of Belgrade (ME1, 2010; ST2, 2010; ST3, 2010) (see Appendix 5). It was not until 
one year later (October 2004) that the Ministry of Education and Sports, now led by a 
different political party, was again involved in the decision making process, although even 
then rather modestly. Finally, while the previous Ministry was described as “too radical” and 
“assertive” in its reform ambitions (BG2, 2010), the Minister in charge of HE in 2004-2007 
period was thought “very considerate” (NS1, 2010) and “a great minister” as he was 
“respectful of university professors” (MA1, 2010). All these are considered to be important 
elements for the decision making process, as they had an impact on the relationships between 
the actors. 
Tradition. Tradition was another phenomenon recognised by some interviewees as relevant 
for their positions. In concrete, tradition is hereby understood a set of customs and beliefs 
passed from generation to generation. Universities in Serbia seem to have a relatively strong 
sense of tradition and this “sense” can as well act as insulation that protects the knowledge 
community from external attempts to inflict change upon them. In the view of some 
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interviewees, tradition is also believed to be something good, of high quality and in need of 
protection (BG2, 2010; MA1, 2010). 
Often mentioned during interviews, tradition is understood as something that is intertwined 
with collective identity and therefore needs to be protected from potentially harmful external 
forces: 
There were both sceptics and those who wanted reforms at all costs, in other words, 
there were those who were extreme reformists and those who wanted to stick to the 
tradition and perhaps change at a slower pace. (NS1, 2010) 
The so-called “conservatives” were recognised to be more in line with these beliefs on 
tradition and its importance: 
...This group of people at that time felt that the introduction of the principles of the 
Bologna Declaration would destroy what was the best and most valuable of Serbian 
science. I am one of those who still think this way. (MA1, 2010) 
The academic community, the interviewee noted, is recognised as “a structure which rests on 
a long tradition and it needs time to process and shape a new idea” (ibid). This notion is very 
much present in the literature on higher education. Clark (1983:183) notes that being deeply 
institutionalized, “the knowledge institution” is “full of constraints upon change” and 
academics are notorious for their resistance to externally imposed demands: 
The University of Belgrade was against all external political reforms. Reforms are not 
bad as such, but they should come from within. (BG2, 2010) 
I thought that changes were needed, but I felt that the change should be bottom-up and 
that faculties and their councils should make proposals and give specific measures 
that could improve their work. (MA1, 2010) 
Put differently, tradition was seen as directly threatened by the reforms and the Bologna 
process. However, it was also argued that tradition was used as a pretext by those who 
objected reform initiatives due to other reasons: 
...Of course that many felt threatened by the reforms, so they tried to protect their 
positions by claiming to be defending Serbian tradition and culture. (MA1, 2010) 
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Be that as it may, tradition, culture, values and beliefs are important factors affecting decision 
making in general and, as argued by Clark, in academia in particular. 
Rules 
 
Ostrom identifies two types of rules, rules-in-form (formal rules) and rules-in-use (informal 
rules). Both types of rules can be external (generated externally, at the constitutional level) 
and internal, formally generated within the group or only reported to have informally existed. 
Here we treat externally generated rules as rules-in-form, while internal rules are rules-in-use. 
Table 4.2 gives an overview of the types of rules given by Ostrom. 
Regulated component 
of an action situation 
Type of rules Rules-in-form Rules-in-use 
Position Position rules yes yes 
Participants Boundary rules yes no 
Actions Choice rules yes yes 
Control Aggregation rules yes yes 
Information Information rules no yes 
Costs/Benefits Payoff rules no yes 
Outcomes Scope rules yes no 
Table 4.2 Formal and informal rules in the decision making process 
The rules which are identified to have been generated only externally are boundary and scope 
rules. In other words, within the scope of its activities, a working group could not decide on 
who were the actors and participants and what was the content of the internal discussions of 
the group, as this had been formally predecided at the constitutional level. 
On the other hand, position, choice and aggregation rules were all both formal and informal. 
Positions could be decided at the constitutional level, but also within the group. For instance, 
the chair of WG 2003-1 was decide by the NCDUE, but according to the notes, other 
members of the group were at some points co-chairing, which was internally decided (MoES, 
2003b). Similarly, all participants other than chair could officially enjoy the same status, but 
in practice their positions varied, such as is the case when in WG 2003-2 students were 
considered equal member, but in practice their standing was not the same as the standing of a 
UniBG representative (BG2, 2003; ST1, 2003; ST2, 2003; ST3, 2003). As regards the choices 
of participants, they were normally limited by the formal rules, but could also be framed by 
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the group itself, or even not framed at all. When it comes to the aggregation rules, it could be 
argued that certain rules of this type were made at the constitutional level of the first two 
action situations, i.e. in the NCDUE, that affected the work of the group. In concrete, the 
University of Belgrade was by this body recognised as an actor whose positions needed to be 
taken into consideration, regardless of the positions of other actors (ME1, 2010; BG3, 2010). 
Aggregation rules could also informally exist within a group. It could be said that within 
every working group all participants nominally participated in the same choice, however, not 
all the voices were taken to have the same weight. For instance, students‟ positions were taken 
into consideration when student-related matters were discussed, such as student parliament or 
the role of student representatives, but not necessarily when issues related to e.g. staff 
promotion or accreditation. It would be important to note that the number of participants per 
actor was in this and similar cases very important, as, e.g. students would end up outnumbered 
by academics whenever they would propose a solution not acceptable for most of the 
academics (BG2, 2010; ST2, 2010; ST3, 2010). 
As regards the information and payoff rules, even though the actors were in general aware of 
others‟ potential moves and costs/benefits calculations, the logic behind individual moves was 
not always clear to all the participants. Also, discussions and likely negotiations happened 
alongside the official meetings of working groups, to which some of the participants did not 
have access and were not familiar with the content of discussions (ST2, 2003; ST3, 2010). 
This is assumed to have as well affected the information flow among the participants and their 
familiarity with others‟ intentions and rationales. 
As it appears, rules were not constant throughout the process and it is evident that the change 
in the type of the constitutional level (described at the beginning of Chapter 4) did affect 
interactions inside working groups. Furthermore, in spite of their vagueness, rules-in-use were 
no less important for the decision making process than the formal ones. 
4.2 Description: the content 
 
The content of the decision making process as analysed here is governance, as stipulated in 
the legal framework. However, the scope of the working groups‟ activity was not only 
deciding on governance arrangements, and it covered other aspects of HE which were to be 
addressed by the HE law: studies, curriculum, quality, scientific work, enrolments, funding, 
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autonomy, staffing, promotion etc. These would not be given particular attention in this study, 
unless they are relevant to the governance related decision making process analysed. It is 
important to note that it was foreseen that the law would facilitate HE reforms in line with the 
Bologna process. This approach could be observed in almost all documents issued by the 
Ministry in the period 2001-2004 (e.g. MoES, 2002). 
With respect to the content of the decision making on governance, both governance at the 
level of the HE system and HE institutions were subjects of the decision making. In addition, 
the internal organisation of universities, in concrete, the relationship between the university 
and the faculty is observed, as this is closely linked with institutional governance and thus 
deserves to be properly analysed. Finally, the three arenas of decision making (external 
governance, internal governance and university integration) are put forward in addressing the 
research problem. 
In the next part of the chapter, the major arenas of debate in the decision making process, as 
identified by the researcher, are presented. Among the three, the university integration was the 
most disputed one, followed by the debate on the composition and competences of 
governance structures of HEIs and finally the external governance structures. 
4.2.1 External governance: the role of the buffer 
 
With respect to governance at the level of the HE system, six new bodies were 
institutionalised by the 2005 LoHE: 
 National Council for Higher Education (NCHE) 
 Commission for Accreditation and Quality Assurance (CAQA) 
 Conference of Universities 
 Conference of Vocational HEIs 
 Conference of University Students 
 Conference of Vocational HEIs Students 
 
As the National Council existed before, this body is not regarded as entirely new, which is 
why it is considered re-institutionalised, rather than institutionalised for the first time. As 
described in Chapter 1, NCHE and CAQA are clear examples of system-level bodies, while 
the conferences are closer to being perceived as networks of their respective institutions or 
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student parliaments. Nevertheless, all six are, by the law, operating at the level of the HE 
system. 
The idea to introduce the National Council for Higher Education, different in its role, 
composition and competences from the one which already existed (NCDUE), first appeared in 
the Reform Concept document (MoES, 2003e). The Ministry justified the existence of this 
buffer by the need to secure the realisation of common interests of higher education 
institutions and the state, as well as solving potential conflicts (MoES, 2003d). The idea was 
also shaped by the experiences from other countries having this kind of structure, which 
would at the same time be a buffer and an expert body whose prime responsibility would be to 
shape HE policy (МЕ1, 2010). However, the idea of the 2001-2004 Ministry with respect to 
this body was not entirely followed throughout the end of the decision making, as many 
compromises needed to be made due to conflicting preferences (ME1, 2010). At an early 
stage it was suggested that this body be appointed by the Government, and that students and 
the state were seen as a part of it. However, this idea was never accepted. From the very 
beginning the academic community representatives insisted that prominent university 
professors be in the National Council, which would act independently from the state (ME1, 
2010). The academic community justified this by the need to protect the university autonomy 
from decision making processes taking place outside its walls and making sure that these 
decisions were taken in line with the interests of universities, in particular the University of 
Belgrade (BG2, 2010). This position regarding the role of the National Council was also 
shared by the interviewee from the 2004-2007 Government (MA1, 2010). 
Regarding the composition of the NCHE, even though not more than 12 of its members are 
academics nominated by conferences, there is a possibility that this body is entirely populated 
by academia representatives (see Appendix 3). In concrete, the remaining four of its members 
(not counting two student representatives in), i.e. “prominent scientists or scholars, cultural 
figures, educators, artists or businessmen” can hypothetically be also academics, only 
appointed by the competent governmental authority
11
. The 2/3 majority was rationalised by 
the understanding that the university autonomy needed to be protected by a buffer from the 
                                               
11 From the 2005 law (Art.10/1/3): four members shall be appointed from among prominent scientists or 
scholars, cultural figures, educators, artists or businessmen, three of them at the proposal of the Government of 
the Republic of Serbia (hereinafter referred to as the Government). One of the three shall be the representative 
of Kosovo and Metohija from the University in Pristina based in Kosovska Mitrovica, while the fourth shall be 
appointed at the proposal of the competent body of the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina. 
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possible abuse of power by the state, as “the university autonomy has this ability to prevent 
radical changes from happening, and this is a positive thing” (BG2, 2010). According to the 
same interviewee, when it comes to the National Council, the idea of the 2001-2004 Ministry, 
was “to take the university governance away from the university itself”, which is why it was 
of utmost university interest to have renowned academics in majority in this body (ibid), as 
well as it was crucial to have the academics run higher education, not politicians (MA1, 
2010). “National Council should be independent, not a state body, as it had been in earlier 
times” (BG1, 2010). However, as it could be inferred from the interviewees and the 
documents, securing the autonomy of HEIs was one of the priorities for the 2001-2004 
Ministry as well (ME2, 2010; MoES, 2003a). Yet it seems that this was not perceived as such 
by some of the academics. 
With respect to the accreditation body, the idea came as a part of Europe-wide trend in 
introducing quality assurance as sine qua non for European higher education and it was also 
linked to the Bologna process. Although it was generally agreed that this body was to be 
independent, the understanding of “independent” was not equally shared by all actors. For 
instance, for an academic community representative, “independence” referred to the 
independence from the state, not from higher education institutions (BG1, 2010; BG2, 2010), 
while both high Ministry officials interviewed argued that the accreditation body should be 
independent from HEIs as well, in order to be objective (ME1, 2010; MA1, 2010). Moreover, 
it was argued that “an agency is governmental, parliamentary or ministerial, but not 
university” and it means that “the authority is imposed from the outside” (BG2, 2010). Which, 
again, disregards the concept of an agency as such. 
Interestingly, the high Ministry official in the first government was of the opinion that having 
an independent accreditation body was indispensable (ME1, 2010), while her follower argued 
against having such a body at all, as the country had no expertise needed at the time: “there 
was no one who would give up the university career and run an independent agency like that” 
(MA1, 2010), assuming that someone without experience in academia would not be 
competent for such a position. Finally, an interviewee argued that it was due to the fact that 
the accreditation body was not completely independent that its title in the end was not 
Accreditation Agency, as initially planned, but Accreditation Commission (BG2, 2010).  
It would be important to mention here that in parallel with the activities of the first three 
working groups, there was an ad-hoc accreditation body appointed by NCDUE, which was 
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not envisaged by the law (LoU 2002). As there were many new private HEIs applying for the 
work permit to the Ministry, the Ministry recognised the need to establish some procedure, as 
such did not existed at the time. Nevertheless, an interviewee suggested that the work of this 
body had affected the idea of having an accreditation agency in a negative way, as many 
university professors were not satisfied with its work and know-how: “if you evaluate 
something you need to have some expertise on how to do it” (MA1, 2010). 
Regarding the role of students in the NCHE, they are present with two representatives, 
without a right to vote and only allowed to discuss on a limited set of issues, related to the role 
of students in the accreditation procedure. Student representatives in the working groups were 
not satisfied with this, but they, as stated, could not do more as their power in the decision 
making was always limited (ST1, 2010; ST2, 2010; ST3, 2010). On the other hand, the 
interviewed academics shared the idea that students should participate in governance, but only 
in certain matters. According to the law passed, the matters in which student representatives in 
NCHE can participate are almost entirely related to internal assessment of HEIs (i.e. in the 
accreditation process) and even here students cannot vote but only discuss (LoHE, 2005, Art. 
11 and 22). Student involvement was according to some academics a positive thing (NS1, 
2010), while some others saw it as a threat for the students, as they could be “easily 
manipulated” (BG2, 2010). 
With respect to the conferences, it would be interesting to bring up the following formulation 
given by the 2005 LoHE: 
Universities referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article shall have the right to delegate 
an extra representative each to the Conference of Universities for every 1,000 
teachers and associate teachers and to delegate an extra representative each to the 
Conference of Universities for every 5,000 students. (LoHE, 2005, Art. 18) 
This formulation clearly benefits large universities, i.e. those with many teachers and students, 
in particular the University of Belgrade which enrols around one third of the entire student 
population in the country
12
. This was first introduced in the first draft of the law in 2003, 
though the number of students was not a factor, while the number of teachers was 1.500. This 
was later in the WG 2003-3 altered to 1.000 teachers and 5.000 students, which increased the 
                                               
12 According to the Activity Report of NCDUE (2004), the University of Belgrade enrolled 50% of the entire 
university student population in Serbia in 2003. 
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percentage of votes pertaining to the UniBG. University of Novi Sad did not agree with the 
notion that the number of students should be a factor, though this was not accepted by the rest 
of the WG 2004-1 (NS1, 2010). An interviewee observed that other universities “considered it 
inappropriate to openly show their disagreement” with the University of Belgrade (ME1, 
2010), as they did not want to oppose this university. On the other hand, this decision was 
fully legitimate to the University of Belgrade representatives: 
A university which was recently founded and has one thousand students in total cannot 
have the same number of votes as a university which is 20 or 50 times bigger. That is a 
reality of life. (BG3, 2010) 
As for the involvement of other stakeholders in system-level governance, apart from the four 
members of the National Council which could in theory represent third-party interests (such 
as the business sector or cultural institutions) and the student representatives, no other 
stakeholder involvement is secured by the 2005 LoHE. The high Ministry official from the 
2001-2004 Government observed that the level of stakeholder involvement prescribed by the 
law “cannot even be called stakeholder involvement”, as no other stakeholders but those who 
had already been there before were represented in this body (ME1, 2010). The interviewed 
representative from the University of Novi Sad explained this by the fact that at the time when 
Serbia was still early in its democratic course, it was not possible to determine who were the 
stakeholders to be involved and this was left to be decided at a later point (NS1, 2010). 
Finally, as it appears, the third working group (WG 2003-3), also known as “the working 
group of the University of Belgrade”, was against any interference of the state in academic 
matters. This was explained by a member of the group in the following way: 
The group, consisting of people who remembered Milošević’s13 days very well, feared 
[these days could repeat], and regardless of the intentions of the government in place 
at the time, it was needed to set institutional guarantees that would prevent the state 
from interfering with academic autonomy, 
                                               
13 Slobodan Milošević (1941 - 2006) served as the President of Socialist Republic of Serbia and Republic of 
Serbia (1989 – 1997) in three terms. He was also President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from (1997 – 
2000). 
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while the 2001-2004 Ministry was seen to have “underestimated possible damage which the 
state could cause to the university community” (BG3, 2010). 
According to the decision makers in the final phase of the process, the role of new external 
governance structures is inextricably linked with institutional autonomy and, what is more, 
one of their main purposes is precisely this – to act as a “buffer” between the state and its 
potential abuse of power, on one hand, and institutions of higher learning, on the other. Or, as 
Neave referred to it (1997:193), “to act as a shock absorber between the short-term pressures 
of partisan politics and the more delicate, because more difficult to maintain, long-term 
concerns of scholarship”. 
4.2.2 Internal governance: who governs? 
 
The discussion on internal governance arrangements were mostly concentrated around the 
composition and competences of the Board and Council (both at the level of faculty and 
university). 
As already indicated, interviewees would give the 1998 law as an argument for the necessity 
to secure institutional autonomy from possible repressive governments (MA1, 2010; BG2, 
2010; BG3, 2010). It is due to this reason that the notion of “autonomy” was without 
exception among some of the interviewed academic community representatives observed 
exclusively as related to the state – HE relationship: autonomy “protects universities from the 
state‟s abuse of power” (BG2, 2010). 
It was precisely this rationale that was given to support to increase in the number of members 
in HEIs Boards which are appointed by the HEI itself, from one half, as envisaged by the 
2003 draft law, to two thirds, as it was later amended by WG 2003-3 and then confirmed by 
the last WG (BG1, 2010; BG2, 2010; BG3, 2010). Namely, the current HE law stipulates the 
following: 
The representatives of the higher education institution shall make up two thirds of the 
total number of Board members referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, rounded off 
to the closest odd number. The representatives of students and the representatives of 
the founder shall be represented with an equal number of members up to the full 
assembly. (LoHE, 2005, Art. 52)  
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Whereas the drafts prepared by the 2001-2004 Ministry‟s suggested one half instead of two 
thirds. This change is obviously benefiting HEIs, though the students were quite dissatisfied 
with this solution (ST1, 2010; ST2, 2010; ST3, 2010). As for the state, the 2004-2007 
Ministry did not object this scenario (MA1, 2010). In referring to this matter an interviewee 
noted: 
I am of the opinion that the university is a conservative environment and this is good. 
An autonomous and conservative, which means that external shocks cannot make 
significant changes. Simply put, it is stable in its course and all changes should take 
place gradually. If proven necessary, they will find their way at the end of the day. [...] 
If the university was in crisis, as it was, the reason for this was not the university itself 
and its internal organisational structure, but the socio-political circumstances. (BG2, 
2010) 
For some academics involved in the process this was apparently vital, also due to the fact that 
the Board was the one to appoint Rector and Dean, both of which were leading figures in their 
HEIs: 
If majority in the governing structures is not appointed by the university it means that 
the autonomy is automatically violated. The election of the Dean and Rector must be 
in the hands of the university, one way or the other. (BG2, 2010) 
Students were the ones most severely opposing this arrangement, though this was in vain, at 
least when it comes to this legal framework. Students, whenever present in the working 
groups (WG 2003-2 and WG 2004-1), would argue for the maximum possible participation of 
student representatives (ST1, 2010; ST2, 2010; ST3, 2010). However, as previously indicated, 
they would be easily outnumbered in votes. 
Another point of disagreement with students was the percentage of student representatives in 
the professional body, i.e. the Council. Students in the WG 2004-1 insisted on having at least 
20% of members of the Council in discussions related to quality assurance, the reform of 
study programmes, analysis of efficiency and determining the number of ECTS credits
14
 
                                               
14 ECTS - The European Credit Transfer and Accumulation System is a student-centred system based on the 
student workload required to achieve the objectives of a programme, objectives preferably specified in terms of 
the learning outcomes and competences to be acquired.”; definition retrieved from 
http://ec.europa.eu./education/programmes/socrates/ects/index_en.html, on April 25 2010. 
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(Studentske organizacije, 2004). This was rejected and it remained that students have up to 
20%, and left this to HEIs‟ statutes to define. 
With respect to competences of the Board, the Council and Rector/Dean, few things have 
changed if compared to 2002 LoU. Interestingly, the WG 2003-3 amended some of the 
competences foreseen for the Board in the 2003 draft law, while at the same time adding new 
competences to the Council. The Board still adopted the statutes, selected the executive 
officer, adopted financial plan, activity report and the annual balance sheet, adopted the 
investment plan and decided on the amount of the tuition fees. Nonetheless, all these had to be 
first proposed by the Council, which was not envisaged in the 2003 draft law prepared by the 
2001-2004 Ministry. These provisions were kept until the end of the process and are part of 
the law now. In other words, the power of the academic staff slightly increased in this process, 
both at the level of faculty and university. In the case of university this was explained as a 
need to enable faculties to protect their own interests, since this Council was then seen as a 
body composed of delegates from the academic bodies of individual faculties (BG3, 2010). 
Even though the composition of the Council was not prescribed by the law, the tradition of 
having faculty deans and professors in the University Council was retained in the university 
statutes (e.g. Univerzitet u Beogradu, 2006; Univerzitet u Novom Sadu, 2006; Univerzitet u 
Kragujevcu, 2010). This combination of management and professional functions within a 
body which is by definition professional (the Council), on one hand, and the co-decision 
competences on non-professional matters shared between the Council and the Board, on the 
other, indicates that the role of the two is somewhat intertwined and not clearly divided both 
by the law and in practice.  
The institutionalisation of student parliaments was recognised by the interviewed student 
representatives as one of the most important achievements of students in the decision making 
process (ST1, 2010; ST2, 2010; ST3, 2010). According to an interviewee, apart from being a 
means for voicing student interests, student parliaments at all faculties and universities were 
as well important for two student organisations which participated in the decision making 
process, the Student Union of Serbia (SUS) and the Belgrade Student Association (BSA) 
(ST1, 2010; ST3, 2010). By establishing student parliaments, SUS and BSA, as well as others, 
would need to channel their interests through these bodies and thus increase legitimacy of 
their activities (ST3, 2010). However, the actual competences of parliaments are very limited, 
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as they do not have power to set in place or prevent any measure, be it of more or less 
relevance for students, unless this is supported by the professoriate. 
Regarding the involvement of other stakeholders, the case of the institutional level was the 
same as of the system level: not all parties to the decision making showed interest in 
institutionalising stakeholder participation in institutional governance. While on one hand, this 
hindered the general idea of stakeholder involvement (ME1, 2010), on the other it was not 
clear then who these stakeholders, apart from students, could be (NS1, 2010). 
Similarly to the case of external governance, institutional governance was as well observed to 
be inseparable from the notion of institutional autonomy. If these two levels were placed 
against each other, an interesting observation could be drawn: seemingly, the professoriate 
strived to create a “double buffer” in order to secure as much autonomy as possible: an 
external one, in the shape of new bodies at the level of the system, almost entirely colonised 
by academics, and an internal, less visible one, permeating all structures of internal 
governance, except for the student parliament. Yet the student parliament has arguably too 
little power to affect the everyday business at Serbian higher education institutions. 
4.2.3 University integration: centralisation vs. decentralisation 
 
The issue of the relationship between the university and faculty was recognised by all 
interviewees as the most disputable topic in this decision making process, in particular in the 
first two working groups (WG 2003-1/2) when the MoES launched the idea to integrate all 
faculties of a university in a single legal entity, which would mean that the faculties would no 
longer be as independent as they had been up to that point. University integration was also 
recommended by the European University Association (EUA) which produced a report on the 
actual situation in all five public universities in Serbia existing at the time. Among other 
recommendations, the EUA report also suggested that: 
This move [integration] must come from a top-down legislative decision, since there 
are too many vested interests in the current fragmented structures for this radical 
change to be possible as an initiative from within the university only. (EUA, 2002:6) 
However, the idea to integrate faculties into one single legal entity (university) was by far the 
most criticised proposition. The loudest opponent to this idea was the University of Belgrade, 
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which was reported by all interviewees and could also be concluded from the WG 2003-1/2 
meeting notes (MoES, 2003b), as well as other documents circulating at the time (e.g. 
Filozofski fakultet, 2003). 
The proposition to integrate universities, and by doing so take the legal independence away 
from faculties within universities, was based on the assumption that universities would be run 
more efficiently if more centralised, however, 
...this idea was not fully supported by anyone [...] not just the University of Belgrade. I 
think this buried the entire higher education reform process in Serbia. You cannot 
reform the system with disintegrated universities, because Serbia does not have seven 
universities, but Serbia has around 100 universities, as every faculty is a university in 
itself and there is nothing one can do about it. (ME1, 2010) 
The core problem with respect to internal university organisation was, in effect, the problem 
of the legal status of faculties. As described in Chapter 1, faculties in Serbia have long 
enjoyed independent legal status, while the university level was reduced to a mere 
administrative centre, without much power over the faculties. Furthermore, by 1992 and 2002 
university laws all governance structures at both university and faculty levels were elected, 
rather than appointed. The exception since 1990 was the 1998 Law on University and this was 
due to political reasons of the regime of the time. 
Judging by the interviews, the rationale for opposing the idea of university integration was 
twofold. The first argument refers to the feasibility of running a university efficiently from 
one centre: 
The University of Belgrade is too complex and too complicated to be run from one 
centre, the Rectorate. [...] the model itself is not an issue. A university can be 
integrated if it was founded as such. [...] Belgrade University is an old and big 
university, physically stretching across several campuses. (BG2, 2010) 
Even though several interviews stressed that the University of Novi Sad was more in favour 
of having an integrating university, the interviewee from this university pointed out that 
integration and full centralisation are different concepts: “Integration is not centralization and 
it would not be good to centralize the university. I'm afraid that it would have equally bad 
consequences as the fragmentation of the university” (NS1, 2010). However, introducing legal 
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mechanisms that would enable universities to decide by themselves the extent to which to 
integrate their faculties appears to have been the point of consensus (BG1, 2010). 
The second rationale offered for resisting the integration process was the one of resources, 
explained in 4.1. According to this logic, the diverse financial situation across Serbian HE 
landscape was challenged, as some of the faculties which had in earlier times accumulated 
considerable income, mostly from tuition fees or commercial services, felt threatened by the 
possibility to lose their own property should the university become legally integrated (MA1, 
2010; BG3, 2010). During the first working groups, the Ministry argued for adopting the 
concept of integrated university, which was, according to an interviewee “consistent but not 
possible” due to the financial interests of some “important” faculties. (MA1, 2010) 
On the other hand, as stated, the Ministry did not offer any alternative with respect to funding 
arrangements: 
One of the main questions was, as it seemed, how to solve the problem of functional 
integration of universities, and not jeopardise funding sources at the disposal of 
individual faculties. (BG3, 2010) 
The same interviewee also argued that even though it seemed that the mostly “rich” faculties 
were opposing the Ministry‟s intentions, “poor” faculties were as well not inclined towards 
this idea, as they considered this a threat for their autonomy. 
It would be important to note that this debate triggered a lot of discussion aiming at finding 
the best possible solution for the university organisation, in particular for large universities. 
For instance, the Ministry and the University of Novi Sad were arguing for the so-called 
“integrated” university, while the University of Belgrade argued for the “federal” university, 
which would be an even looser structure than the one found in public universities at the time. 
Eventually it was decided to introduce the concept of “functional integration”, which was 
defined as “a middle ground between the old system, in which you had full decentralization 
and most of the power in the hands of faculties, and a solution offering absolute centralization 
which is unsuitable for big universities, such as Belgrade and Novi Sad” (BG1, 2010). 
Functional integration means that some of the competences which previously belonged to 
faculties were now transferred to the university level. The 2005 LoHE contains an article 
defining the “integrative” function of university, stating the following, among other things: 
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The university shall integrate the functions of all the institutions and units that it 
comprises, particularly the faculties, by conducting unified policies aimed at continual 
promotion of the quality of courses and improvement of scientific research and artistic 
creativity. (LoHE, 2005, Art. 48) 
However, the high Ministry official from the 2001-2004 Government argued that this novelty 
made little or no impact on the level of integration of universities and consequently for the 
implementation of HE reforms (ME1, 2010; ST2, 2010). 
Yet it remains unanswered to what extent these provisions have actually unified a university 
and, what might be even more relevant, in what ways and whether at all they have facilitated 
HE reforms, initiated by the Ministry of Education and Sports back in 2001. 
In spite of the many indicators pointing in both directions, it is not entirely clear which of the 
two rationales (“feasibility” or “resources”) can better explain the underlying motive of the 
academics being persistent in striving to preserve the legal independence of their faculties, or 
whether there was a third, more secluded rationale. Hence, it is not unlikely that a confluence 
of these two and possibly other, more or less transparent, motives was responsible for the final 
scenario.  
4.3 Analysis: factors, actions and interactions 
with respect to the three arenas 
 
It can be concluded that all three arenas were subject to the workings of exogenous variables, 
however, not all in the same manner, to the same extent and by the same variables. For 
instance, while mutual actor relations both inside and outside action situations seem to have 
had an effect on the outcome of the decision making process as regards all three arenas, the 
effect of HE financing situation, for instance, varied. 
Importantly, it could be noted that rules, in particular formal, affected all arenas in a similar 
fashion, as they determined the composition of the groups, their scope, available actions, etc. 
and in that way affected the arenas‟ internal dynamics. In concrete, the fact that not all 
working groups were composed of the same participants was of relevance for the decisions 
taken and the output of the group‟s work. This is in particular visible when the decisions of 
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different working groups are compared. For instance, since the WG 2003-3 was the least 
diverse one and was composed of the University of Belgrade representatives only, its 
decisions were clearly more in line with UniBG‟s interests than it was the case with the 
previous working groups which had been more diverse. Simultaneously, rules-in-use were 
also directing action, though in a less transparent manner, but likely not with less intensity. 
For instance, implicit rules about which actor‟s position counted more and who had the right 
to speak on certain issue and who had not were of undeniable relevance for the outcome of the 
decision making. 
4.3.1 External governance: the role of the buffer 
 
With respect to the system-level governance transformations, several exogenous variables 
were at work in affecting the direction of decision making. One of them is the impact of 
European trends in the domain of quality assurance on Ministry‟s initial reform concept from 
the beginning of 2003. Student participation was as well encouraged by international 
institutions and organisations, which had an effect on introducing student parliaments in 
Serbia. However, it must be noted that this acted in confluence with an increasingly active 
student body in Serbia, starting from the student protests against the regime throughout 1990s. 
Nonetheless, even by introducing Student Conference and securing two places in the NCHE 
for student representatives (without vote and limited participation), the actual power of 
students over HE affairs remained rather limited. 
Further to this, the notion of young and yet insufficiently developed democratic institutions at 
the time, in combination with still fresh memories from the state‟s repression of the 
university, seemingly played the role in making the academics more weary of the state‟s 
intentions, regardless of which political option was behind them. This “atmosphere of 
weariness” could also be noted in the composition and competences of the NCHE and CAQA. 
Last but not least, the diverse institutional landscape and unequal status of higher education 
institutions, with a clear domination of the University of Belgrade in various ways, was 
crucial to the composition of the Conference of Universities. 
In sum, even though the transformations were inspired by European trends, this influence was 
of a limited outreach, as the local dynamics in the actor interplay set the final contour of the 
system architecture and the distribution of authority. The fact that the academia penetrated the 
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system-level and even earned itself a notable role in system steering is a clear indicator of 
how the authority at the system-level of Serbian HE was redistributed in the decision making 
process: away from the state and towards the academic rule. Nonetheless, albeit various 
structures appeared at the system level for the first time, the Serbian case could not be labelled 
multi-level multi-actor governance stricto sensu, as no significant change in the actor 
constellation variety was brought by the 2005 law. 
4.3.2 Internal governance: who governs? 
 
Regarding internal governance arrangements, it can be noted that the persistence of the 
academics in the decision making process in having majority in the HEIs Board was justified 
by the need to secure institutional autonomy and minimise the political and other undesired 
external influence on HEIs. However, this could have also been linked to the internal financial 
operations of faculties and their reluctance to risk their own income. Furthermore, assigning 
the role to the Council to propose matters not always related to strictly academic issues (such 
as tuition fee level, investment or financial planning), contrary to what the first draft law had 
suggested, could be an indicator of the ambition of the professoriate to reaffirm its role as the 
ultimate manager of higher education institutions. At the university level, where the Council 
is the body in which faculty Deans meet, this could be an indicator that the faculties aspired to 
the role of the ultimate manager of the university. 
Even though the underlying rationale might be different, the 2001-2004 Ministry argued for 
more autonomy for HEIs, in the same way as the institutions themselves did. Yet this Ministry 
also considered strengthening accountability mechanisms, an idea which was obviously not 
equally shared by the academics, as it never went further from the accreditation process, 
legally speaking. While the Ministry recognised the trend of deregulation in HE across Europe 
and perceived the law as a mere framework, the academics saw institutional autonomy as a 
way to protect themselves from the state and likely protect their own financial and other 
resources. If the latter were true then the fear of the state turning authoritarian would not be 
the exogenous variable in question, but this would rather be the question of resources 
affecting preferences of actors. 
As for the students, their role in the governing structures from the one they had by the 2002 
LoU had not changed, at least for the university sector. Even though student parliaments were 
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institutionalised in the 2002 LoU, they were rarely implemented, and it was not until 2005 
that this provision became mandatory for all HEIs. Nonetheless, the participation of student 
parliaments in the institutional-level decision making is not defined by the 2005 LoHE.  
In sum, the combination of several exogenous variables affected the decision making on 
internal governance. The most significant ones were the understanding of the traditional role 
of academics in governing universities in combination with limited resources provided by the 
state for HE, the HEIs‟ own income, the lack of trust in governmental policies in general and 
the relationship between the Ministry and the academia (in particular the 2001-2004 
Ministry).  
Finally, the question of who governs a higher education institution does not seem to be 
difficult to answer: the professoriate. The influence of the state, the students and other 
possible stakeholders on internal governance is, at least in theory, limited. Yet, as the 
academics were “in charge” in the final part of the decision making, this seems as a logical 
outcome. 
4.3.3 University integration: centralisation vs. decentralisation 
 
With regards to the university integration problem, it seems that situation with respect to HE 
financing and resource distribution had a greater impact on the outcome than other factors, 
even though this was not always clear. On the other hand, it was argued that this opposition to 
the idea of integration was as well related to the allocation of public resources to HEIs, as the 
state did not offer any guarantee that faculties would not lose by giving up their legal status 
and independence. 
Furthermore, it is hereby argued that the rather paradoxical state of the art that the university 
is governed by its faculties is, in effect, one of the main reason for the professoriate to fight 
for retaining the status quo. In line with the “resource” argument, as long as it allows the 
faculties to keep their legal and financial independence, “functional integration” is an 
acceptable solution. In line with the “feasibility” argument, as long as the university is kept 
loose, its faculties will manage to govern themselves, for which they need to be also 
autonomous from the university, not only from the state. 
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It would be interesting to mention, that the self-governance idea is in line with Weick‟s 
concept of universities as loosely coupled systems, which, as he argues, have many 
advantages, such as flexibility and adaptability of an institution, independence and uniqueness 
of its elements, less resources spent on coordination, low extent to which a breakdown in one 
part distorts other parts, etc, just to name a few (Weick, 2000). To some extent, Weick‟s 
concept offers an explanation to why faculties in Serbia feel comfortable with “standing on 
their own” and not showing an interest to change the state of the art: “If all of the elements in 
a large system are loosely coupled to one another, then any one element can adjust to and 
modify a local unique contingency without affecting the whole system” (2000:131). 
Nevertheless, what appears to be the case here is not precisely what Weick was referring to, as 
the loose internal structure of public universities in Serbia was not a result of careful planning 
by central management aiming at increasing efficiency, but rather a result of historical 
development. In addition, the loose coupling in the case of Serbian universities is not 
accompanied by proper feedback and accountability mechanisms which would keep the 
elements of the structure (the university) in accord. 
4.4 Conclusions 
 
The analysis of the decision making process draws the conclusion that deciding latest 
governance transformations in Serbian higher education were to a greater extent affected by 
internal dynamics of actors‟ interaction, socio-political and historical context and path 
dependence than by supra-national trends. The latter they, however, do resemble when given a 
surface look. Even though the latest changes in system-level governance entail the 
proliferation of actors involved in system governance, it appears that apart from students (to a 
limited extent), no other stakeholder actors were guaranteed a say in Serbian higher education 
alongside the state and the academic community. Hence, the latest transformations in Serbian 
HE system governance is not a typical case of a multi-level multi-actor governance, rather a 
hybrid produced by various factors in which one actor – the academia – has gained 
considerable power. As for the role of the state, it is without doubt that it has assumed a more 
supervisory role. Nonetheless, this was likely not a result of any state strategic plan aiming at 
increasing efficiency of higher education or introducing elements of network governance, but 
rather a spontaneous consequence of a set of events surrounding and penetrating the decision 
making arenas. 
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The 2005 Law on Higher Education gives HEIs more autonomy as regards their internal 
governance arrangements, which is also noted to be a trend across Europe. The law also 
presumes that the professoriate is capable of running large and complex HEIs, as it does not 
provide for any professionalisation of institutional leadership, but leaves this entirely to HEIs 
themselves. Even more so in the case of system-level arrangements, which implies that the 
professoriate is knowledgeable and capable enough of making decisions which should affect 
not only the entire HE system, but also the society at large, through higher education. 
Furthermore, the law does not couple autonomy with accountability and output-based funding 
mechanisms. Even though the quality control structures and mechanisms have been foreseen 
by this law, these as well only superficially resemble the idea by which they were inspired, as 
their independence is very limited, if it at all exists. This all points to the notion that through 
this law the academic representatives not only strived to insulate the academic institution from 
external influences, but also to make the professoriate less responsible for their future 
decisions (as accountability mechanisms were not introduced). Finally, it was the academic 
representatives who assumed the responsibility of running autonomous HEIs and creating 
policies for the HE system, as they were the authors of the law. Therefore, the conclusion 
points to a somewhat paradoxical situation in which responsibility does not involve 
accountability. 
Interestingly, although the ambition to secure more autonomy was considered legitimate by 
all the interviewed actors, the rationale of this ambition varied. While some argued that the 
actors were rational and strived to protect their own interests by not being more accountable to 
the state and society than they had been before, other argued that a university was expected to 
defend its autonomy, as this is one of the main element of its traditional identity. As Maassen 
and Stensaker (2003) argue, the increased institutional autonomy, as it also goes for self-
regulation, do not necessarily have to be steering strategies in themselves, but rather “an end 
in itself” whose symbolic meaning prevail over the rational and pragmatic reasoning of 
sustaining them. Nonetheless, it is difficult to identify which rationale prevails in the case of 
Serbia and it is highly likely that more than one was operating in this case. 
Regarding the governance structures within HEIs, the 2005 law gives more freedom to 
institutions in defining their internal organisation. On the other hand, it has made the roles of 
the Board and the Council rather overlapping, which adds to the lack of clarity in their 
respective managerial and professional competences. More precisely, the academic body was 
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given competences over organisational and financial issues of the institution, which are 
normally expected to belong solely to the governing body – the Board, even though the 2/3 of 
this body are also university professors. This as well indicates that the academic community 
aimed at securing its position as the ultimate manager of HEIs, as well as at securing the 
sovereignty in dealing with its internal affairs. This professional coordination, as Clark terms 
it, is not a new phenomenon in higher education. However, it is not a direction other European 
countries have taken with respect to governance, where, for instance, a shift towards more 
market coordination is observed (Jongbloed, 2008). 
The persistence in protecting higher education institutions from the state or other external 
pressures seems to be one of the leitmotifs of the decision making process under study. It can 
be observed across all three action arenas and linked to several exogenous variables. In turn, 
these variables were often found to be working together into the direction of reinforcing the 
argumentation in favour of ever increasing institutional autonomy. As an upshot of this, new 
buffers were institutionalised, the existing ones reinforced, while the professional and 
managerial roles blended. Even though it is not entirely clear to what extent the academics 
involved in the decision making aimed at being rational, all these facts point into that 
direction. 
Furthermore, this perseverance in retaining the status quo is seen as typical of academia, for 
whom change stands as one of the major challenges (Clark, 1983). In this respect, 
understanding path dependences is of key importance to understanding why the direction of 
change was not more in line with the governance trends in Western European countries, as 
this change would have probably been too radical indeed. In the case of Serbia, change is even 
less acceptable when it implies more power to the state, as this has proven to be indeed 
harmful for HEIs. Nonetheless, as some interviewees pointed out, change is only acceptable 
when generated from within the object of change. However, it is difficult to imagine that an 
entity which is inherently resistant to change can inflict considerable change upon itself in a 
relatively short period. This is even more difficult to picture of large and complex systems, 
such as the University of Belgrade is. 
Regarding the decision making arenas in which this state of the art was generated, it can be 
noted that the current higher education external and internal governance reflects the 
relationships and dynamics present inside action arenas. In concrete, the distribution of 
authority at both system and institutional levels resembles the power relations inside the 
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decision making arena in which the academic community representatives were virtually 
“controlling” the process. The current distribution of authority as regards both external and 
internal governance is now more in line with the preferences of the academic community and 
the 2004-2007 Ministry, and less in line with what the students and 2001-2004 Ministry 
argued for. The outcome of the decision making on university integration is as well in line 
with the preferences of academics and the 2004-2007 Ministry, but not in line with what the 
first Ministry and students originally preferred. However, the preferences over the level of 
integration varied inside the academic community group, in particular in the first phases of the 
process. Yet, the University of Belgrade, as the most dominant institution, managed to infuse 
the law with its own preferences over the level of integration, which others eventually 
followed. In sum, many compromises were made, either because a certain side was weak 
enough to confront, or because it decided not to confront beyond a particular level. In 
concrete, students were not strong enough to confront the academics, while the state, in the 
case of the 2001-2004 Government, was not ready to do so beyond a certain point. The 2004-
2007 Government was not at all willing to go against the preferences of universities, but 
rather ally with them. 
Finally, the analysis of the decision making process draws several main conclusions. First, the 
process of deciding latest governance transformations in Serbian higher education was only to 
a limited extent affected by supra-national trends which they resemble when given a surface 
look. Yet, they were far more affected by actors‟ interaction and preferences, “rules of the 
game”, historical and political events at the moment of decision making and path dependence. 
Second, the power redistribution in the higher education system remarkably reflected the 
power distribution pattern inside decision arenas: those who were most influential during the 
decision making process managed to project that power base on the outcome of the decision 
making. Third, institutional autonomy and resource dependence were in the heart of the 
debate on future rules of decision making, as they were key driving forces of the process. In 
other words, autonomy of institutions and the control over resources have been recognised as 
the two most valuable assets at stake for the academics in the decision making process on new 
governance arrangements in Serbian higher education. 
 
79 
 
5 Summary and reflections 
 
This study has explored the possibility to understand the latest governance transformations in 
Serbian higher education by analysing the decision making process generating the direction 
and nature of change. The Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework has been 
used as the analytical tool, accompanied by the bounded rationality approach in the 
understanding of individual. In-depth semi-structured interviews and documentary analysis 
have been employed as research techniques. The findings confirm usefulness of the decision 
making process analysis in understanding governance changes and also offer a deeper 
appreciation of the Serbian higher education system, its governance and the dynamics of 
interaction of its key actors. This chapter reflects on the IAD framework, the bounded 
rationality concept and the methodology used, followed by the reflection on the main 
conclusions. 
5.1 Reflections on the framework and 
methodology 
 
The IAD framework proved to be an instrumental tool for approaching decision making 
process studied here, primarily due to its flexibility and scope. However, the framework itself 
does not hint which of its elements are more crucial to the understanding of the phenomenon 
studied, which makes the task of the researcher more demanding and somewhat risky, as it 
relies on her ability to estimate. Nonetheless, this did not appear to be an obstacle while 
conducting the research, as all the main elements of the IAD framework were given proper 
attention. In addition, using the limited rationality approach as the accompanying tool was 
indeed helpful in following the actors‟ logic of action. Furthermore, even though the 
framework does not offer a possibility to predict future events, as it lacks the precision of a 
theory, it can still help the researcher generate conclusions which could be insightful for 
future analysis of phenomena in particular settings, such as it is the case with the higher 
education system in Serbia. 
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With regards to the decision making in the context of the IAD framework, it can be said that 
the decision making process was affected by various exogenous variables, although, the actual 
effect of each variable depended on participants‟ interpretation of it. The relevance of the 
same variable varied across arenas, depending on its relation with the object of the decision 
making. In sum, the actual effect an exogenous variable had on the action arena depended on 
the relevance assigned to it by the participants in the arena. 
As regards to outcomes and action-outcome linkages, participants in this study did indeed 
assign different values to different potential outcomes, although their choices were not always 
in line with their own preferences and, as already mentioned, many compromises needed to be 
made. However, they were in line with their beliefs of what would be the best choice in a 
concrete setting. These beliefs, in turn, were affected by social, political and historical 
circumstances. Also, costs and benefits were often weighted against each other. Participants 
also had varying level of control, which was in particular visible in situations when the more 
and the less influential actors would have different preferences over an issue. As for the 
information, it could be said that actors were in general aware of others‟ potential moves, 
although the logic behind individual moves was not always clear to all the participants. 
The participants in the decision making process had preferences. These preferences were more 
or less shared, or not shared at all, with other participants. Even though participants could be 
consistent in their preferences over time, their choices did not have to follow their preferences 
in the same manner, as compromises were also made. Also, if participants in the decision 
making process were intendedly rational this rationality was constrained by various contextual 
factors, such as rules, institutions, choices made in the past, etc. In turn, these contextual 
factors have proven to be insightful for a better understanding of participants‟ preferences, 
choices and decisions. 
With respect to the methodology, using interviews in combination with documents in 
analysing decision making proved a valuable combination. This was in particular noticeable 
during the description and analysis of findings by means of the IAD framework and bounded 
rationality approach. 
As already indicated, due to already mentioned time constraints and other limitations 
encountered in conducting research (Chapter 3), not more than ten interviews have been 
conducted, which is considered rather limiting, as more informants would offer additional 
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perspectives to the subject. Additional secondary data (documents), which would further 
enrich the analysis, would have as well been of high value to the researcher. 
5.2 Reflections on the main conclusions 
 
With respect to the research findings, it could be noted that they have confirmed the starting 
assumption, i.e. that governance transformations can be better understood if the decision 
making process leading to them is approached for answers. At the same time, the specificities 
of this complex decision making process are for the most part reflected in the hybrid 
governance arrangements which emerged from it. 
Due to the specific historical, political and economic circumstances Serbian higher education 
found itself at the turn of the century, the governance reforms it embarked on were not bound 
to be on the same path with the reforms encountered in Western democracies. As Peters 
(2001) rightly noted, only elements of these reforms can be found in the context studied here, 
i.e. the context of a developing and transitional countries. Even though the reforms were 
driven both by ideological and pragmatic motives, as it is the case with Western European 
countries (Maassen, 2003), these motives were not equally shared by all the parties which had 
a say in Serbian higher education governance arrangements. It was by this logic that the 
efficiency, effectiveness and accountability narratives of the 2001-2004 Ministry yielded to 
the self-governance and institutional autonomy narratives of the professoriate. In parallel, the 
new “managerialism” and other management mechanisms, as well as stakeholder involvement 
have gone missing in Serbian higher education, precisely due to the idiosyncratic nature of the 
context, out of which its academia has emerged as its ultimate manager. On the other hand, 
although the transformation of the state‟s traditional controlling role into a more supervisory 
role has indeed taken place, the position of the state has weakened rather than transformed. 
Simultaneously, the conditions for institutionalisation and interaction of new actors and 
structures at different levels of the HE system, i.e. “multi-level multi-actor governance” have 
not been secured, which further strengthened the position of academics in Serbian higher 
education governance structures. 
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Appendices
15
 
 
Appendix 1. Interview guide 
 
Introductory questions 
 How would you describe the general climate as regards HE in Serbia at the turn of the 
century? 
 How would you describe the relationship between the state, the academic community and 
student representatives in that period? 
 When participated in the working group(s), how did you find HE reforms? 
 
Working groups 
 How would you describe the work of the group(s) you participated in? 
 How would you describe the relationship between the state, the academic community and 
student representatives inside the working group(s)? 
 Which topics were the most discussed ones? 
 In what way were decisions made? 
 What was the level of involvement of group participants in the discussions? 
 
Perceptions of other participants’ actions 
 How did you perceive the role and actions of the state representatives? (not asked if the 
interviewee is a state representative) 
 How did you perceive the role and actions of the student representatives? (not asked if the 
interviewee is a student representative) 
 How did you perceive the role and actions of the academic community representatives? 
(not asked if the interviewee was an academic community representative) 
 
External governance arrangements 
 What was the rationale behind the idea of having the National Council for Higher 
Education and what was your position as regards this matter?  
 What was the rationale behind the idea of having the Accreditation Commission and what 
was your position as regards this matter? 
 What was the rationale behind the idea of having the Conferences and what was your 
position as regards this matter? 
 What was the rationale behind the competences given to these bodies and what was your 
position as regards this matter? 
 Were any of these affected by international trends? 
 
Internal governance arrangements and internal university organisation 
 What was the rationale behind the composition and competences of the governing Board 
and the Council decided by the working group(s) you participated in and what was your 
position as regards this matter? 
 What was the rationale for retaining university as a network of legally independent 
faculties and what was your position as regards this matter? 
 Were any of these affected by international trends? 
                                               
15 Tables in Appendices 3 and 4 are based on the respective laws (not university/faculty statutes), to be found in 
the References under Narodna skupština Republike Srbije, 1992, 1998, 2002 and 2005. 
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Appendix 2. List of interviewees 
 
Code 
 
Institution/organisation 
 
Official position Period 
Working group 
(action situation) 
Position in the 
working groups 
ME1 
National Council for the 
Development of Univ. Education 
Member 2002 – 2004  N/A N/A 
Ministry of Education, HE Unit High Ministry official 2001 – 2003  2003 – 1, 2003 – 2 Chair/MoES repr. 
MA1 
University of Belgrade Board member 2000 – 2004 
2003 – 2  Member/UniBG repr. 
2003 – 3 Chair/UniBG repr. 
Ministry of Education, HE Unit High Ministry official 2004 – 2005 2004 – 1  Chair/MoES repr. 
ME2 Ministry of Education, HE Unit Associate 2001 – 2007  
2003 – 1 
MoES repr. 
2003 – 2 
BG1 University of Belgrade 
Faculty of Law professor 1979 – present  2003 – 1 Member/UniBG repr. 
Board member 2004 – present 
2003 – 3 Member 
2004 – 1 Member/UniBG repr. 
BG2 University of Belgrade 
Faculty Dean 2002 – 2004  2003 – 2 Member/UniBG repr. 
High University official 2004 – 2006  2004 – 1 Member 
NS1 University of Novi Sad 
High University official 2000 – 2004 2003 – 1, 2003 – 2 Member/UniNS repr. 
High University official 2004 – 2009 2003 – 1, 2004 – 1 Member/UniNS repr. 
BG3 University of Belgrade High University official 2004 – 2006  
2003 – 3 Member 
2004 – 1 Chair/UniBG repr. 
ST1 Student Alliance Belgrade Board member 2000 – 2004  (2003 – 2) Observer 
ST2 
Student Alliance Belgrade Board member 2001 – 2003  
(2003 – 3), 2004 – 1 Member/Student repr. 
University of Belgrade Faculty-level student repr. 2002 – 2003  
ST3 University of Belgrade 
University-level student 
repr. 
2004 – 2005  2004 – 1 Member/Student repr. 
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Appendix 3. System-level HE governance structures in Serbia 1992 – present 
 
Level 1992 Law on University 1998 Law on University 2002 Law on University 2005 Law on Higher Education 
System 
Government 
Government 
Government Government 
National Council for 
Higher Education 
Development 
(All Rectors + members 
appointed by the 
Government) 
National Council for Higher 
Education Development 
(All Rectors and Vice-
Rectors + 10 members 
appointed by the 
Government) 
National Council for Higher Education 
(12 members from academia (10 nominated by the Conference 
of Universities and 2 by the Conference of Vocational HEIs 
upon a public call) + 4 prominent scientists or scholars, 
cultural figures, educators, artists or businessmen (nominated 
by the Government upon a public call, one of which is from 
the University of Priština (Kosovska Mitrovica) and one 
representing Vojvodina Province); all selected by the National 
Assembly (Parliament); NCHE can also have 2 student repr. 
appointed by the Student Conference, without a voice)  
Commission for Accreditation and Quality Assurance 
(15 members from academia; nominated by the Conference of 
Universities, upon a public call and selected by the National 
Council for Higher Education) 
Conference of Universities 
(All universities, represented by their Rectors)  
Conference of Vocational HEIs 
(All vocational HEIs, represented by their Directors) 
Conference of University Students 
(Delegates from university student parliaments) 
Conference of Vocational HEIs Students 
(Delegates from vocational HEIs student parliaments) 
Institutional 
University University University 
Higher education 
institutions (University) 
Higher education institutions 
(vocational HEI) 
Faculties, institutes Faculties, institutes Faculties, institutes Faculties, institutes 
Table A.1 System-level governance structures in higher education in Serbia 1992 – present 
91 
 
Appendix 4. Institutional-level HE governance structures in Serbia 1992 – 
present 
 
Type of body 1992 University Law 1998 University Law 2002 University Law 2005 Higher Ed. Law 
Supervisory body None 
Univ./Faculty Supervisory 
Board 
None None 
Governing body 
University/Faculty Board 
Rector/Dean 
Univ./Faculty Board 
University/Faculty Board 
Rector/Dean 
University/Faculty Board 
 
Executive body None Rector/Dean None Rector/Dean 
Professional body Council Council Council Council 
Table A.2 Types of management structures in HEIs in Serbia 1992 – present (Nadzorni organ, organ upravljanja, organ poslovođenja i stručni 
organ) 
 
Board members 
elected/appointed by 
1992 University Law 1998 University Law 2002 University Law 2005 Higher Ed. Law 
University Faculty University Faculty University Faculty Higher Education Inst. 
Founder 50% 50% 100% 100% 17% 17% 17% 
HEI 50% 50% 0% 0% 66% 66% 66% 
Students 0% 0% 0% 0% 17% 17% 17% 
Other 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Table A.3 University/faculty governing body 
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Appendix 5. Actors and participants in the decision making process 
 
Actor 
Institu
tion 
WG 2003-1 participants WG 2003-2 participants WG 2003-3 participants WG 2004-1 participants 
S
ta
te
 
G
o
v
er
n
m
en
t  5 Ministry of Education and Sports 
repr. (including the Assistant 
Minister for HE) (Chair) 
 2 Ministry of Science and 
Technological Development repr. 
 1 Ministry of Culture repr. 
 5 Ministry of Education and 
Sports repr. (incl. the Assistant 
Minister for HE) (Chair) 
 2 Ministry of Science and 
Technological Dev. repr. 
 1 Ministry of Culture repr. 
 None 
 Assistant Minister for HE (Chair of 
the WG 2003-3) (Chair) 
A
ca
d
em
ic
 c
o
m
m
u
n
it
y
 
P
u
b
li
c 
u
n
iv
er
si
ti
es
  3 UniBG repr. (2 academic staff 
repr. + Secretary General) 
 1 University of Arts representative 
 1 UniNS representative 
 1 UniKG representative 
 1 UniNI representative 
 1 University of Kosovska 
Mitrovica representative 
 7 UniBG repr. (6 academic 
staff repr. + Secretary General) 
 1 University of Arts repr. 
 1 UniNS representative 
 1 UniKG representative 
 1 UniNI representative 
 1 University of Kosovska 
Mitrovica representative 
 UniBG Board Member 
(Chair)  
 UniBG Board President 
 UniBG Rector 
 2 of UniBG Vice-Rectors  
 7 UniBG representative 
 UniBG Secretary General 
 
 UniBG Board President 
 UniBG Rector 
 UniBG Vice-Rector 
 6 UniBG representatives 
 UniBG Secretary General 
 1 repr. of the University of Arts 
Final draft approved by the Rectors of 
UniNS, UniKG, UniNI, and Uni. of Arts 
P
ri
v
at
e 
u
n
iv
er
si
ti
es
 
 1 University "Braća Karić" repr. 
 1 European University for 
International Management repr. 
 1 University "Megatrend" repr. 
 1 University "Braća Karić" 
repr. 
 1 European University for 
International Management repr. 
 1 University "Megatrend" repr. 
 None 
Officially, private universities were not 
signatory to the work of this WG. 
However, interviewees reported their 
presence at sessions. 
V
o
ca
ti
o
n
al
  1 School of Economics repr.  
 1 Electrical Engineering School 
representative 
 1 School of Economics repr.  
 1 Electrical Engineering School 
repr. 
 None 
Officially, vocational post-secondary 
institutions were not signatory to the 
work of this WG. However, interviewees 
reported their presence at sessions. 
S
tu
d
en
ts
 
S
tu
d
en
t 
re
p
r.
 
 None 
 Student Vice-Rector of UniBG 
 1 Student repr. of UniNS 
 1 SUS representative 
 None 
 Student Vice-Rector of UniBG 
 Student vice-Rector of UniNS 
 1 SUS representative 
 1 BSA representative 
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